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INTRODUCTION 
  This article is about justice and culture and what they mean for each other.  It’s about 
creativity and play and writing novels and remixing songs.  Particularly, it is about people doing 
all of these things with one another.  To explore these topics, this article investigates what John 
Rawls’s political theory of justice, “justice as fairness,” means for laws that regulate cultural 
production, particularly copyright law, and what such laws mean for justice as fairness. 
                                                 
* Ph.D. Student, UCLA Department of Philosophy.  J.D., Harvard Law School, 2010.  I would 
like to thank Marlon Arias, Yochai Benkler, Julie Cohen, Norman Daniels, Caroline DeCell, 
Clark Donley, William Fisher, Ashley Gorski, Sabrina Karim, Roy Kreitner, Frank Michelman, 
and Henry Richardson for their many insightful comments and their support.  I would also like to 
thank Harvard Law School for supporting my research with a Summer Academic Fellowship. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  2 
  I begin in Part I by describing Rawls’s account of justice as fairness with particular 
attention to his proviso guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political liberties.  I argue that the 
reasons that Rawls gives for the proviso apply just as much to many of the basic liberties 
connected to cultural freedom as to the equal political liberties.  I argue that the best solution to 
this problem, within the limited world of Rawlsian political theory, is to adopt a similar proviso 
for the cultural liberties.  Like the equal political liberties, these liberties should be considered 
constitutional essentials.  I call the theory of this proviso “semiotic justice,” and I argue that 
semiotic justice adequately addresses the shortcomings that justice as fairness has with respect to 
cultural liberties.
1  I then argue that “semiotic justice” requires some modifications to Rawls’s 
political conception of the person.  In Part II, I explain how semiotic justice can be applied to 
American copyright law.  Semiotic justice does not provide an overarching doctrinal theory of 
copyright that judges can simply apply to decide cases, but it does provide a benchmark against 
which we can evaluate how well the American copyright system is doing.  In Part III, I flesh out 
the specifics of what semiotic justice means for copyright law by exploring what it has to say 
about copyright protection for useful articles, joint authorship, copyright duration, the scope of 
copyright protection, and the fair use doctrine. In Part IV, I contrast semiotic justice with four 
other strands of copyright theory, including welfare based theories, fairness theories, personhood 
theories, and Aristotelian theories, and I argue that semiotic justice offers, at least in some 
instances, an improvement to these theories that better achieves the liberal goal of neutrality of 
aim among different conceptions of the good. 
                                                 
1 “Semiotic justice” is a modification of John Fiske’s phrase, “semiotic democracy.”  JOHN 
FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-39 (1987) (arguing that television fosters a “semiotic 
democracy” through its playfulness); see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 28-31 
(2004) (deploying the phrase “semiotic democracy” in a theory of intellectual property). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  3 
  The theory that I develop in this paper is a political theory, and it speaks from the 
perspective of citizens doing political philosophy.  But it also attempts to develop an 
understanding of how political philosophy can speak effectively about culture, understanding 
that there is a give and take between politics and culture, that neither is antecedent to the other, 
and that it would be possible to develop a cultural theory of politics that is just as accurate as my 
political theory of culture.
2  My theory operates within the big tent of liberalism, situating itself 
in relation to Rawls in Part I and to several other liberal theories in Part IV. If semiotic justice 
succeeds as a theory, it will suggest some possible resolutions to conflicts that are embedded in 
liberal society.  Furthermore, as a Rawlsian theory, I hope that semiotic justice can attract an 
“overlapping consensus” of liberal theories of copyright that will endorse its precepts which are, 
I will argue in Part IV, “thinner” than those of the other theories of copyright.  However, by 
exploring the connection between culture and political justice, my theory might at least explain 
how cultural conditions can contribute to such a visceral commitment to liberalism. 
I.  JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND SEMIOTIC JUSTICE: THE FAIR VALUE OF CULTURAL LIBERTIES  
  In this section, operating at the level of ideal political theory, I draw on Rawls’s account 
of justice as fairness and explore why Rawls incorporates a proviso into his theory of justice that 
guarantees the fair value of the equal political liberties.
 3  I argue that just as this guarantee of the 
fair value of political liberties is necessary for the development and exercise of what Rawls 
identifies as the first moral power (the capacity for a sense of justice), it is necessary to guarantee 
the fair value of cultural liberties in order to ensure that people can develop and exercise the 
second moral power (the capacity for a conception of the good).  I designate my theory of the 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151 (2007) (articulating a theory of creativity largely from the standpoint of culture). 
3 See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 48 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  4 
fair value of the cultural liberties “semiotic justice.”  Relying on arguments drawn from literary 
and cultural theory, I argue that the ability to participate in shaping what a culture looks like is a 
necessary element of expressing and developing one’s own conception of the good, and I argue 
that many of the reasons that it is important to guarantee the fair value of the political liberties 
apply to cultural liberties as well.  Ultimately, I argue, the urgency of cultural liberties is so great 
that their fair value is a constitutional essential: a legitimation worthy constitution is one that 
guarantees the fair value of the cultural liberties (as well as of the equal political liberties). 
  A central and deeply attractive feature of John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness is its 
commitment to ensuring that individuals are able to choose for themselves what matters most 
about their lives and providing as many people as possible the resources to pursue the meaning 
that is important to them, without requiring society to pass judgment on what forms of life are 
and are not worth pursuing, or deciding for individuals what they should care about.  However, 
while Rawls premises his account of justice as fairness on an intuitively attractive political 
conception of the person, his theory ultimately runs into a problem by failing to recognize the 
extent to which individuals’ capacities to form and pursue conceptions of the good are shaped by 
the culture, and not just the political system, that they inhabit. 
A.  Rawls’s Account of Justice as Fairness and the Equal Value of the Political Liberties 
  In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls begins his statement of his theory by 
outlining a number of “fundamental ideas,” including the roles of political philosophy,
4 the idea 
of society as a fair system of cooperation,
5 the idea of a well-ordered society,
6 the idea of the 
basic structure,
7 the idea of the original position,
8 the idea of free and equal persons,
9 the idea of 
                                                 
4 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 1-5. 
5 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 5-8. 
6 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 8-10. 
7 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 10-12. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  5 
public justification,
10 the idea of reflective equilibrium,
11 and the idea of an overlapping 
consensus.
12  For the moment, I will focus in on the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation and the idea of free and equal persons.   The idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation is “the most fundamental idea in [the] conception of justice” as fairness.
13  This idea 
has, for Rawls, three essential features.  First, social cooperation is more than mere socially 
coordinated activity.  It is not simply “activity coordinated by orders issued by an absolute 
central authority” but is “guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures which those 
cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.”
14  Second, it is marked by a 
commitment to reciprocity, including “the idea of fair terms of cooperation” that “each 
participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that everyone else 
likewise accepts them.”
15  Third, it includes the idea that participants in social cooperation 
pursue their “rational advantage,” which “specifies what it is that those engaged in cooperation 
are seeking to advance from the standpoint of the good.”
16 
  A second fundamental idea that Rawls relies on is the idea of free and equal persons.  
This idea of persons is a political conception, meaning that it “is not taken from metaphysics or 
the philosophy of mind or from psychology,” although it must be compatible with some set of 
possible philosophical and psychological conceptions of the person.
17  Instead, it is “worked up 
from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of a democratic society, in its 
                                                                                                                                                            
8 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 14-18. 
9 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 18-24. 
10 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 26-29. 
11 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 29-32. 
12 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 32-38. 
13 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 5. 
14 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 6. 
15 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 6. 
16 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 6. 
17 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 19. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  6 
basic political texts (constitutions and declarations of human rights), and in the historical 
tradition of the interpretation of those texts.”
18  The idea of the person that Rawls comes up with 
on the basis of examining the “enduring writings that bear on . . . [the] political philosophy” of a 
democratic society is that persons have “the two moral powers”
 19: 
(i) One such power is the capacity for a sense of justice: it is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation. 
(ii) The other moral power is a capacity for a conception of the good: it is the 
capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.  
Such a conception is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a 
person’s conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of what is 
regarded as a fully worthwhile life.  The elements of such a conception are 
normally set within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrines in light of which the various ends and aims are 
ordered and understood.
20 
These powers are not momentary but instead realized over the course of a full life.
21  Further, 
citizens are regarded as equal persons in that “they are all regarded as having to the essential 
minimum degree the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a complete 
life and to take part in society as equal citizens.”
22 
                                                 
18 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 19. 
19 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 20. 
20 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
21 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 19. 
22 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 19. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  7 
  To illustrate several fundamental ideas, including the conception of persons as having the 
two moral powers, Rawls constructs a hypothetical initial choice situation, which he calls the 
original position, where representatives of the parties to social cooperation try to agree on a 
conception of justice that all of the parties can share.  In the original position the representatives, 
situated behind a “veil of ignorance,” “are not allowed to know the social positions or the 
particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent,”
 nor do they know the “race 
and ethnic group, sex, or various native endowments such as strength and intelligence” of the 
people they represent.
23  The parties do know “the general commonsense facts of human 
psychology and political sociology.”
24  This initial choice situation represents the first of four 
stages of social cooperative decision-making, where more information about the parties is 
revealed in each subsequent stage.  After the first stage of identifying principles of political 
justice comes the second stage of constitution making, followed by legislation, and then by 
adjudication.  The later stages give life to the principles of justice selected in the first stage, and 
the veil of ignorance is lifted a bit further in each stage subsequent to the first.   
  Within this original position, and given the conception of persons as having the two 
moral powers, Rawls argues that the parties to social cooperation will select two principles of 
justice, which are: 
 (a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
                                                 
23 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 15.  The representatives do know, however, that the people they 
represent have certain minimum moral, intellectual, and physical capacities.  See JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 184 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  
24 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 101. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  8 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
25 
These principles are lexically ordered, with “the first principle . . . prior to the second” and, 
within the second principle, “fair equality of opportunity is prior to the difference principle.”
26  
For the moment, I will not explore all of the mechanics behind the adoption of these principles, 
except to note that the basic liberties referenced in the first principle are specified by list, and 
include “freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; political liberties (for example, the right 
to vote and participate in politics) and freedom of association, as well as rights and liberties 
specified by the liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) of the person; and finally, the 
rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.”
27  This list of basic liberties is arrived at by 
considering “what liberties provide the political and social conditions essential for the adequate 
development and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons.”
28  Rawls 
divides up the basic liberties into those that “enable citizens to develop and exercise [the moral] 
powers in judging the justice of the basic structure of society and its social policies,” which are 
“the equal political liberties and freedom of thought,” and those liberties that “enable citizens to 
                                                 
25 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 42-43.  The difference principle means that, “unless there is a 
distribution that makes both persons better off (limiting ourselves to the two-person case for 
simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred.”  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 76 
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE].  Thus, if two parties were choosing in the 
legislative stage between three economic systems (each of which satisfied the first principle and 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity) where system A would yield a distribution to two 
parties of (9, 9) (in units of primary goods), system B a distribution of (10, 13), and system C (8, 
16), parties following the difference principle would prefer B over either A or C and A over C. 
26 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 43. 
27 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 44. 
28 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 45. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  9 
develop and exercise their moral powers in forming and revising, and in rationally pursing 
(individually or, more often, in association with others) their conception of the good.”
29  Thus, 
the basic liberties are supposed to ensure that people who are participating in a project of social 
cooperation are able to realize both moral powers, and cooperators would not give up these basic 
liberties, or even risk doing so, because surrendering these liberties would mean giving up on the 
centrality of the moral powers to the conception of the person that Rawls presupposes. 
  Norman Daniels objected to the mechanics of the first principle shortly after the 
publication of A Theory of Justice in an essay titled “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of 
Liberty.”
30  Daniels objection to Rawls takes the following form: Rawls assumes that political 
equality is compatible with significant social and economic inequality (because the difference 
principle will always permit such inequalities, provided that they are to the advantage of the least 
well off).
31  Furthermore, the views of the best off classes are most likely to be advanced in the 
media,
32 and the unequal value of liberty flows from (usually) legal exercise of the abilities, 
authority, and power that accompany wealth.
33  Thus, the unequal value of the basic liberties can 
result in a cascading effect of entrenched advantage and disadvantage, as the already well off 
gain control of the media and thereby of the political process.  Daniels argues that parties in the 
original position, knowing that it may not be possible to develop adequate constitutional 
safeguards to prevent inequalities in wealth from producing inequalities in liberty, “might not be 
                                                 
29 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 45. 
30 Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and the Unequal Worth of Liberties, READING RAWLS 253 
(Norman Daniels ed., 1975). 
31 Daniels, supra note 30, at 254. 
32 Daniels, supra note 30, at 256.  For example, wealthy individuals may be able to purchase 
campaign advertisements advancing their views in political campaigns, leading in turn to 
increased political influence. 
33 Daniels, supra note 30, at 257. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  10 
able to accept the conjunction of the First and Second Principles.”
34   Rawls attempts to solve 
this problem by distinguishing between liberty and the “worth of liberty,” writing that: 
The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of 
poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally is sometimes counted 
among the constraints definitive of liberty.  I shall not, however, say this, but 
rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to 
individuals of the rights that the First Principle defines.
35 
Daniels responds to this distinction by arguing that on the basis of Rawls’s own theory, this 
distinction is arbitrary.
36  Specifically, Daniels argues, public knowledge of the worth of 
citizenship liberties
37 can serve as a basis for self-respect, and “it is hard to see how the well-
ordered society could succeed in guaranteeing that the affirmation of equal liberties would 
successfully serve as the basis of self-respect bur prevent knowledge of unequal worth of liberty 
from playing any role.”
38  The parties in the original position, who would want “to avoid at 
almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect,”
39 would be rational in 
insisting on a guarantee not just of equal citizenship liberties, but on their equal worth.
40  
  This critique prompted Rawls to respond by clarifying that a proviso to the first principle 
requires that the equal political liberties (and only these liberties) be guaranteed their fair value to 
all persons.
41  This proviso, Rawls says, responds to the objection that the equal liberties in a 
                                                 
34 Daniels, supra note 30, at 258. 
35 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 204. 
36 Daniels, supra note 30, at 263. 
37 “Citizenship liberties” is Daniels’s term for the liberties related to the parties’ ability to 
“influence and participate in the political process.”  Daniels, supra note 30, at 275.   
38 Daniels, supra note 30, at 276. 
39 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 440, quoted in Daniels, supra note 30, at 273. 
40 Daniels, supra note 30, at 277. 
41 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 148 n.20. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  11 
modern state are merely formal.
42  Rawls specifies that this proviso “means that the worth of the 
political liberties to all citizens, whatever their economic or social position, must be sufficiently 
equal in the sense that all have a fair opportunity to hold public office and affect the outcome of 
elections and the like” and that “[t]he requirement of the fair value of the political liberties, as 
well as the use of primary goods, is part of the meaning of the two principles of justice.”
43  
Rawls’s reasoning for the proviso parallels Daniels’s argument about the importance of ensuring 
that all citizens have a roughly equal chance of making their voices heard in the political arena: 
the proviso “secures for each citizen a fair and roughly equal access to the use of a public facility 
designed to serve a definite political purpose, namely the public facility specified by the 
constitutional rules and procedures which govern the political process and control the entry into 
positions of political authority.”
44  Additionally, Rawls concedes that the difference principle is, 
by itself, insufficient to prevent the distortion of the value of the equal political liberties.  The 
“public facility” of political institutions “has limited space as it were.  Without a guarantee of the 
fair value of the political liberties, those with greater means can combine together and exclude 
those who have less. . . .  The limited space of the public political form, so to speak, allows the 
usefulness of the political liberties to be far more subject to citizens social position and economic 
means than the usefulness of other basic liberties.”
45  Concretely, one implication of this 
guarantee of the fair value of political liberties is that the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo
46 is inconsistent with the requirements of justice as fairness because it 
                                                 
42 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 148-49. 
43 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 149. 
44 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 150. 
45 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 150. 
46 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down limits on expenditures in favor of 
individual candidates for office imposed by the Election Act Amendment of 1974 because such 
limits are direct and substantial limitation on political speech). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  12 
“seems to reject altogether the idea that Congress may try to establish the fair value of the 
political liberties.”
47 
  Rawls makes abundantly clear that this proviso of the fair value of the equal political 
liberties extends only to these liberties and no further.  Rawls reasons that “the fair value for all 
the basic liberties” need not be secured.
48  Doing so would be “either irrational, or superfluous, 
or socially divisive.”
49  Supposing that such a requirement would “mean[] that income and 
wealth are to be distributed equally,” the requirement would be irrational because it would “not 
allow society to meet the requirements of social organization and efficiency.”
50  If such a 
condition requires that “a certain level of income and wealth is to be assured to everyone in order 
to express their ideal of the equal worth of the basic liberties” then it would be superfluous, as 
the difference principle already has the effect of requiring this, since the difference principle 
requires the basic structure to be arranged in a way that will guarantee that every individual has 
the greatest level of income and wealth possible, consistent with the first principle of justice and 
the fair equality of opportunity.
51  But if guaranteeing the fair value of the basic liberties “means 
that income and wealth are to be distributed according to the content of certain interests regarded 
as central to citizens’ plans of life, for example religious interests, then it is socially divisive.”
52  
Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness “rules out claims based on various wants and aims 
arising from people’s different and incommensurable conceptions of the good.”
53  For example, 
requiring that more resources be allocated to members of society who claim religious needs to 
                                                 
47 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 360. 
48 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 150. 
49 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
50 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
51 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
52 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
53 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  13 
erect magnificent temples than to those citizens who do not claim such religious needs would 
violate justice as fairness.
54  Thus, Rawls argues, while the equal political liberties must be of 
roughly equal usefulness for all citizens, such a requirement cannot be extended to the other 
basic liberties. 
B.  Semiotic Justice: The Fair Value of the Cultural Liberties 
   For Rawls the equal political liberties appear on the list of the basic liberties because 
these liberties along with freedom of thought allow citizens to develop their first moral power, 
“judging the justice of the basic structure of society and its social policies.”
55  In the initial 
choice situation of the original position, citizens’ representatives would insist on guaranteeing 
the fair value of the equal political liberties because, given the possibility for structural 
distortions of the worth of political power, endorsing the principles of justice without such a 
proviso would risk parties losing their ability to lead lives in which they could realize and 
develop the first moral power.  Because the moral powers are so fundamental to personhood, the 
representatives would be unwilling to even risk damaging the first moral power, argues Rawls.
56  
Of course, the parties would be equally unwilling to gamble with the second moral power.  The 
basic liberties of liberty of conscience and freedom of association are, Rawls says, connected 
with “the capacity for a (complete) conception of the good.”
57  I argue that to the extent that 
these liberties are cultural liberties, their fair value must be guaranteed in order to ensure that 
citizens are able to develop the second moral power.
58  Citizens’ representatives in the original 
position would be unwilling to risk losing this capability and would, therefore, insist on a proviso 
                                                 
54 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
55 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 45. 
56 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 106-10. 
57 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 113. 
58 Cf. William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three 
Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 876-78 (1999) (describing “expressive 
liberty”). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  14 
of what I call “semiotic justice” parallel to the proviso of the fair value of the equal political 
liberties when they form and agree upon their political conception of justice, particularly justice 
as fairness. 
  The first step of my argument is to argue that trustees in the original position know 
certain “general commonsense facts” about culture, including the following.   
  “Culture” is a space where members of a society articulate and develop their conceptions 
of the good.  When I talk about “culture” without any definite or indefinite article, I am speaking 
of this space rather than of any particular set of conceptions deployed within it.  What constitutes 
“culture,” like the basic liberties, is given by a list.  Roughly speaking, culture is “all those 
practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative 
autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, 
one of whose principle aims is pleasure.”
59 These are mechanisms that people use to share and 
                                                 
59 EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, at xii (1993).  For Said, culture is also “a concept 
that includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s reservoir of the best that has been 
known and thought, as Matthew Arnold put it in the 1860s.”  Id. at xiii.  The practices that 
constitute culture have only relative autonomy from politics.  In many ways, of course, culture is 
intensely political.  See, e.g., EDWARD SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM 128-29 
(2001) (criticizing Pascal Casanova for suggesting that “literature as globalized system has a 
kind of integral autonomy to it that places it in large measure just beyond the gross realities of 
political institutions and discourse”); see also, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 21 (2d ed. 1996) (“If the masses are not thrown a few novels, they may react by 
throwing up a few barricades.”).  Indeed, cultural practices are often intimately connected with 
politics.  Thus, some space for culture is certain to be guaranteed by the proviso of the fair value 
of the equal political liberties.  However, culture is about many other things, too, centrally 
connected to many individuals’ conceptions of the good.  The partial autonomy of culture might 
also be understood as an analogous to Duncan Kennedy’s description of the relationship between 
law and politics:  
Even in Clausewitz’s famous formulation, war is politics by other means, not 
“just” politics.  In Carl Schmitt’s flip of Clausewitz, politics is war by other 
means, but not reducible to war.  War as “means” can be an end, or a means to 
other ends than politics.  If law is politics, it is so, again, by other means, and 
there is much to be said, nonreductively, about those means. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  15 
learn about their own and other conceptions of value, meaning, or the good.  This list is vague, 
because the precise contours of “culture” shift over time and from place to place.
60  Furthermore, 
culture is a public facility, particularly one that allows for the exercise of the second moral 
power.  Culture as a public facility is not any one conception of culture, but rather the space in 
which conceptions of culture play out.  The space is not given wholly by the political practices of 
the state, making it somewhat more attenuated from the principles of political justice than the 
facility of political space, but it is defined in important ways by the rules that are provided for its 
regulation by the state and it is, in this way, part of the basic structure of society.
61  The 
expressions of conceptions of the good that occupy the space of culture powerfully shape the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos 
eds., 2006).  Similarly, culture is politics by other means and, although it may always be possible 
to draw lines from politics to culture and back, culture has a domain that is at least partially its 
own and that is, in some meaningful ways different from the domain of politics.  See PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 37-38 (Randal Johnson trans., 1993) (“[T]he 
literary and artistic field . . . is contained within the field of power . . . while possessing a relative 
autonomy with respect to it, especially as regards its economic and political principles of 
hierarchization.”). 
60 Selma James provides an exemplary filling-out of the many things that go into culture in a 
particular situation: 
The life-style unique to themselves which a people develop once they are 
enmeshed by capitalism, in response to and in rebellion against it, cannot be 
understood at all except as the totality of their capitalist lives.  To delimit culture 
is to reduce it to a decoration of daily life.  Culture is plays and poetry about the 
exploited; ceasing to wear mini-skirts and taking to trousers instead; the clash 
between the soul of Black Baptism and the guilt and sin of white Protestantism.  
Culture is also the shrill of the alarm clock that rings at 6 a.m. when a Black 
woman in London wakes her children to get them ready for the baby minder.  
Culture is how cold she feels at the bus stop and then how hot in the crowded bus. 
Culture is how you feel on Monday morning at eight when you clock in, wishing 
it was Friday, wishing your life away.  Culture is the speed of the line or the 
weight and smell of dirty hospital sheets, and you meanwhile thinking what to 
make for tea that night.  Culture is making the tea while your man watches the 
news on the telly. 
SELMA JAMES, SEX, RACE, AND CLASS 13 (1975). 
61 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 10. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  16 
resources that citizens who partake of the culture have available to them when forming, revising, 
and pursuing their own conceptions of the good.
62   
  Additionally, the public facility of culture has limited space.  As in politics, “[n]ot 
everyone can speak at once, or use the same public facility at the same time for different 
purposes.”
63  The limited nature of this space combined with its semi-autonomous nature makes 
it likely that, as in the realm of the political liberties, differences of wealth and status that are 
permissible under the difference principle will be amplified in this space, allowing those with 
more power in the space of culture to shape the conceptions of good that are available in the 
cultural space.
64  For instance, in the domain of literature, which is a sub-domain of culture, there 
is “a paradoxical sort of marketplace, constituted around a non-economic economy, and 
functioning according to its own set of values: for production and reproduction here are based on 
a belief in the ‘objective’ value of literary creations—works denominated as ‘priceless.’”
65  
                                                 
62 On the power of cultural resources to form and shape the ability of participants in that culture 
to develop and pursue their own conceptions of the good, see R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 
(Can.); Mozert v. Hawkins, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985); LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 1971); ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin 
Hoare trans., 1971); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS (Mark 
Poster ed., 2001); FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE 
CAPITALISM (1991); JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 55-66 (1987); EDWARD SAID, CULTURE 
AND IMPERIALISM (1993); see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (new ed. 2001); 
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1984).  
63 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 110. 
64 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY (Chris Turner trans., 
2005); BOURDIEU, supra note 59; PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE RULES OF ART (Susan Emanuel trans., 
1996); PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 
(Richard Nice trans., 1984); PASCALE CASSANOVA, THE WORLD REPUBLIC OF LETTERS (M.B. 
Depevoise trans., 2004). I do not mean to suggest that culture is shaped only by politics and law; 
there may be sources of culture that arise independently from politics.  See generally, e.g., 
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey trans., 1961) (1930) 
(describing culture as arising from the psychological structure of human beings). 
65 Pascale Cassanova, Literature as a World, 31 NEW LEFT REV. 71, 83 (2005). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  17 
Furthermore, in this “world literary space,” “prestige is the quintessential form [that] power takes 
. . . the intangible authority unquestioningly accorded to the oldest, noblest, most legitimate (the 
terms being almost synonymous) literatures . . . .”
66  And domination in this world literary space 
exists in a variety of forms, “linguistic, literary and political domination—this last increasingly 
taking on an economic cast.”
67  These three forms of domination “overlap, interpenetrate and 
obscure one another to such an extent that often only the most obvious form—political-economic 
domination—can be seen,”
68 but because literature exists as a semi-autonomous domain with its 
own non-economic measures of worth, literary domination is non-identical with political 
domination, and particularly with economic domination.  Winning Nobel Prizes in literature, for 
instance, is not clearly correlated with the GDP of an author’s country, but wining this prize is 
correlated with writing in a way that engages in a particular way with a chain of literature going 
back to writings produced several hundred years ago in the vicinity of the river Rhine.
69   
Because literary power can be accumulated outside of economic and political power, it is 
possible from a Rawlsian perspective for inequalities that are permitted by the difference 
principal to grow into intractable domination in literary space, allowing those individuals (like 
authors and editors) and entities (like the Swedish Academy, which grants the Nobel Prize in 
Literature) who control access to prestige to act as gatekeepers, determining who can and cannot 
contribute their expression to world literary space.
70 
                                                 
66 Cassanova, supra note 65, at 83. 
67 Cassanova, supra note 65, at 87. 
68 Cassanova, supra note 65, at 87. 
69 See Cassanova, supra note 65, at 74; see also Franco Moretti, Conjectures on World 
Literature, 1 NEW LEFT REV. 54, 54 (2000). 
70 Of course, this is not just arbitrary control; power can be accumulated in world literary space 
over time precisely because access to the literary center is determined by how literary texts relate 
to the existing world literary canon; if an author writes a novel that engages in the right way with Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  18 
  I take the foregoing description of the economics of literary production (or, in any case, 
some description similar enough to it to demonstrate that power can be accumulated in the 
domain of literature independently of economic and political power and that this accumulation of 
power can lead to the accentuation of economic and political inequalities in the cultural realm) to 
be sufficiently apparent to be counted as general knowledge about political sociology available 
to the parties in the original position.  Likewise, it seems apparent that something like this 
account can be extended to visual art as well.
71   
  The extension of this story beyond bourgeois “high” art and literature to cultural 
production is somewhat trickier.  Is the production of, say, television programming structured in 
a way that allows individuals and institutions to accumulate power over time, gradually leading 
to the accentuation and exaggeration of otherwise permissible inequalities?  An optimistic view 
is taken by John Fiske, who argues that television is “a text of contestation which contains forces 
of closure and of openness and . . . allows viewers to make meanings that are subculturally 
pertinent to them, but which are made in resistance to the forces of closure in the text . . . .”
72  
Thus, “[t]elevision  is a ‘producerly’ medium,” where “the work of the institutional producers of 
its programs requires the producerly work of the viewers and has only limited control over that 
work.”
73  This is what Fiske calls television’s “semiotic democracy.”
74  Other cultural theorists, 
however, are not as sanguine about the “openness” of late capitalist cultural production.  Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, for instance, argue that a “culture industry” dominates the 
field of popular production and that accumulations of capital are necessary for individuals or 
                                                                                                                                                            
the tradition of literature that makes up the global literary center, the gatekeepers are supposed to 
grant the novelist admission (and the gatekeepers often actually do so). 
71 See BOURDIEU, supra note 59, at 40. 
72 FISKE, supra note 1, at 239. 
73 FISKE, supra note 1, at 239. 
74 FISKE, supra note 1, at 239. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  19 
entities to participate in the development of mass culture.  “Only those who can keep paying the 
exorbitant fees charged by the advertising agencies . . . those who are already part of the system 
or are co-opted into it by the decisions of banks and industrial capital, can enter the 
pseudomarket [of culture] as sellers.”
75  Liberties to write, to make music, or to mash up videos 
are not worth the same amount to everyone; some people in a political society are far better 
positioned to make use of these liberties than others. Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis may 
seem dated.  Particularly, one may wonder whether technological developments subsequent to 
their writing, and especially the Internet, have fragmented “the culture industry.”   But more 
contemporary cultural theorists suggest that, in spite of technological changes in cultural 
production in the past-half century, much cultural production is still performed by heavily 
capitalized institutional actors.
76 
  Before proceeding to the next step of my argument, I note that this picture of literature 
and, by extension, of culture (or a picture similar to it) is crucial for my account of semiotic 
justice.  If you do not think it plausible that literary power is at all distinct from underlying 
economic and political power, that literature is just superstructure, you are likely to think that 
any principle of political justice focused specifically on cultural liberties is superfluous, given the 
requirements of a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties and the difference principle.
77  If 
                                                 
75 MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAGMENTS 131 (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 2002).  
76 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 106 (2008) (arguing that “read only” culture “will 
[continue to] flourish in the digital age.”); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 
63 (1990) (“Whatever we do with the concept, we should not read postmodernism as some 
autonomous artistic current.  Its rootedness in daily life is one of its most patently transparent 
features.”). 
77 I say “plausible” because, if you think that this is a plausible description of how cultural 
production works, and you are a risk averse party in the original position, and you think that, 
absent safeguards, the structure of cultural production might prevent some people from realizing 
the second moral power, you might insist on building safeguards into the principles of justice to Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  20 
cultural space does not have the tendency to allow a small number of people to accumulate 
cultural power, then following the first and second principles may produce the best outcomes for 
cultural liberties that can be achieved.  You might still find that when it comes to providing 
guidance for legislatures or courts it is helpful to remind them of the importance of cultural 
freedoms, but think that doing so is a matter of practical politics, not of political justice.  Or if 
you are a value pluralist, with a loosely articulated doctrine of political and non-political values 
who cares about rights of cultural expression, and you reject my picture of the economics of 
culture, then you might take my argument as a reason to join a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, 
but you will not see the semiotic justice proposal as a requirement of justice. 
  I now move to the second step in my argument.  The shape of culture is tightly connected 
to the ability of participants in that culture to form, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of 
the good.  While the range of possible conceptions of the good is not strictly limited to the exact 
set of such conceptions in a culture in which one is born, the vast majority of conceptions of the 
good that persons exercising the second moral power will form over the course of a complete life 
will fall more or less in the range of conceptions of the good in the society or societies in which 
they live most of their lives.  Cognitive psychologists might describe this as the result of an 
availability heuristic.
78  This availability may also harden, in certain circumstances, into 
something like “ideology,” systematically foreclosing particular conceptions of the good.
79  
                                                                                                                                                            
prevent this from happening.  Cf. Daniels, supra note 30, at 258 (“Assuming these rational 
agents value equal liberty as strongly as Rawls says they do, they would not want to risk losing 
that equal liberty.”). 
78 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207, 208-09 (1973). 
79 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for 
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 542-34 (1982) (“Male power is real; it is just not what it claims to be, 
namely the only realty.  Male power is a myth that makes itself true.  What it is to raise 
consciousness is to confront male power in this duality: as total on one side and as a delusion on Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  21 
Furthermore, culture is one of the vital fields in which conceptions of the good are presented, 
worked out, revised, and evaluated in public. 
  If the picture I draw of cultural power is right, the ability of certain actors to accumulate 
cultural capital and exercise disproportionate power over the field of culture that prevents other 
citizens from participating in the give and take of cultural life, which in turn enables citizens to 
form conceptions of the good, is shaped by the rules established by political society that 
circumscribe the space of culture’s public facility.
80 The conclusion of this second step is that, 
because of the extent to which conceptions of the good are endogenous to the articulations of 
these conceptions in cultural space, in order to fully develop and realize the second moral power, 
citizens must be able to participate in the culture-process, expressing their conceptions of good in 
the shared facility of culture.
81   
  In light of the possibility that access to cultural space will be distorted by (otherwise 
permissible) inequalities in wealth and power in much the same way that political space will be 
so distorted without Rawls’s proviso, and because such a distortion will similarly undermine the 
capacities of the parties to social cooperation to develop the two moral powers over the course of 
their lives (albeit with an emphasis on the second moral power rather than the first), the third step 
of my argument is that it is necessary for a Rawlsian political theorist to modify the two 
                                                                                                                                                            
the other. In consciousness raising, women learn they have learned that men are everything, 
women their negation, but that the sexes are equal.  The content of the message is revealed true 
and false at the same time; in fact, each part reflects the other transvalued. If ‘men are all, 
women their negation’ is taken as social criticism rather than simple description, it becomes clear 
for the first time that women are men’s equals, everywhere in chains.  Their chains become 
visible, their inferiority—their inequality—a product of subjection and a mode of its 
enforcement. . . .  Feminism has unmasked maleness as a form of power that is both omnipotent 
and nonexistent, an unreal thing with very real consequences.”). 
80 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 176-211 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE (2004); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
159-67 (2011). 
81 Cf. Galston, supra note 58, 877-78. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  22 
principles of justice with a second proviso, of semiotic justice.
 82  The proviso of semiotic justice 
provides the following: 
(1) The worth of all cultural liberties to all citizens, whatever their economic or 
social position, must be sufficiently equal in that all have a fair opportunity to 
contribute to public cultural expression and to affect the shape of cultural space 
and so on. 
As with the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties, this idea “parallels 
that of fair equality of opportunity in the second principle.”
83 
(2) Furthermore, when the parties adopt the two principles of justice in the 
original position, they understand the first principle to include the proviso of 
semiotic justice. 
When integrated into Rawls’s account of justice, semiotic justice will lead to the inclusion in the 
first principle of justice “a proviso that the equal political liberties, [and the cultural liberties,] 
and only these liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.”
84 
  Why would we want to integrate this proviso into the first principle, rather than adopting 
it as a clarification of what the principle of fair equality of opportunity together with the 
difference principle means for laws regulating culture in the legislative and judicial stages?  The 
reason is that the urgency of the cultural liberties is so great that they number among the 
constitutional essentials: if these liberties are not guaranteed, citizens risk losing the opportunity 
to develop their second moral power, a risk that they must be unwilling to take, given Rawls’s 
political conception of the person.  The constitutional essentials, those items necessary for a 
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constitution to be legitimation worthy, include the first principle of justice along with some 
narrow principle “requiring an open society, one with careers open to talents” and a “social 
minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens.”
85  The principle of an open society and 
the social minimum are much narrower than the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle, respectively, but the first principle in its entirety is a constitutional essential.  
That the proviso of semiotic justice is a constitutional essential is not the same as saying that it 
should be judicially enforceable.
86  That is, a constitution could include the proviso of semiotic 
justice, but this proviso might be accompanied by a “judges, keep out” sign, like the Indian 
constitution and its list of “Directive Principles of State Policy,” leaving enforcement of the 
proviso up to the legislature, the executive, and the citizens themselves.
87 
C.  Rawlsian Objections 
  A Rawlsian might respond to my project by asking: why doesn’t the first principle of 
justice, by itself, require that the basic structure be constituted in a way that does not allow the 
accumulation of cultural capital in a small number of hands?
88   
  There are three reasons why not. First, when the parties to the original position deliberate 
about the principles of justice, they “know all general facts about human society.”
89  I take my 
picture of the economics of culture to be part of these general facts, and I do not take it as being 
wholly determined by the basic structure of a political society.  In other words, however the basic 
structure of society is constituted, cultural space will tend to be limited (because it, like politics, 
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86 See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification, in 
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 26 (Daphne Barak-Erez & 
Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). 
87 See INDIA CONST. art. 37. 
88 I would like to thank Seana Shiffrin for raising this question. 
89 Henry S. Richardson, Rawlsian Social-Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled, 10 J. 
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is a shared public facility), and cultural power will tend to accumulate.
90  I take this as a 
descriptive fact about how culture works.  Thus, the basic structure must be designed in a way to 
counteract the effects of this feature of culture, rather than in a way that prevents this feature 
from arising in the first place.
91   
  Second, by negative implication, Rawls’s description of the fair value of the equal 
political liberties suggests that, absent a proviso similar to that provided for the fair value of the 
political liberties, expressive cultural liberties are equally likely to have different values for 
different people and to be worth less for those who are the worst off in a political society that 
satisfies the difference principle.  The basic liberties guaranteed by the first principle are “equal” 
basic liberties, and the equality of these liberties is required in “our capacity as citizens to be free 
and equal” because “we would not put our basic rights and liberties at risk so long as there is a 
readily available and satisfactory alternative.”
92   Basic liberties, including rights of free 
expression, are each “of fundamental importance”; they are liberties that we want to ensure that 
everyone has and are not willing to gamble with.
93  Furthermore, given my description of the 
economics of culture, the very nature of expressive liberties gives rise to the possibility of great 
inequalities in the cultural space under conditions of inequality permitted by the difference 
                                                 
90 Cf. Daniels, supra note 30, at 257 (“If one thought that the mechanisms through which unequal 
wealth operates to destroy equal liberty were simple and insolatable, then perhaps constitutional 
provisions could be devised to solve the problem.  Rawls, for example, suggests constitutional 
provisions for the public funding of political parties and for the subsidy of public debate (pp. 
225-6).  But there is little reason to believe that the mechanisms are so simple and that such 
safeguards would work.”).  
91 I take this as an illustration of the principle that the principles of justice can be arrived at from 
a specification of the initial choice situation in which the cooperating parties deliberate or, vice 
versa, the conditions of the initial choice situation can be defined by working from a particular 
set of principles of justice.  See Richardson, supra note 89, at 429.  Here, I change the conditions 
of the initial choice situation of the original position by specifying the general facts known by the 
parties to include the facts about the economics of culture that I have described. 
92 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 104. 
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principle.  This might be remedied by interpreting the basic liberties as something more than 
negative guarantees that the government will not interfere with citizens, treating liberties of free 
expression as requiring not only that all citizens have a chance to speak, but also that they have 
the chance to be heard.   
  This leads to my third reply: this approach of guaranteeing the fair value of expressive 
cultural liberties by defining the liberties themselves to include a requirement of their fair value 
would work equally well for the equal political liberties; rather than appending a proviso to the 
first principle of justice to ensure that the political liberties have their fair value for all, Rawls 
might have defined the equal political liberties to include “the equal opportunity to hold public 
office and to affect the outcome of elections, and the like.”
94  This would have had the same 
effect as the proviso, but would have operated as an interpretation of the values themselves.   
This is why Rawls is able to state that the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties 
is to be understood as part of the first principle, rather than as an independent, freestanding 
principle of justice.  The proviso of semiotic justice, like the proviso of the fair value of the equal 
political liberties, can be understood as a precissification of the first principle of Justice as 
Fairness; it is an explanation of how the first principle does itself require that cultural expressive 
liberties be given their fair value, rather than a freestanding principle. 
  Alternatively, a Rawlsian might respond by saying that there is no need to turn semiotic 
justice into a constitutional essential.
95  The fair value of the political liberties is a constitutional 
essential, because of the usefulness of these liberties in making the whole basic structure 
                                                 
94 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 149.  It could be that a similar move could not be made with respect 
to expressive liberties because the equal value of political liberties is of central importance; but 
Rawls is committed to guaranteeing the equality of all of the basic liberties, not just the political 
liberties.  See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 105. 
95 I would like to thank Frank Michelman for raising the objection described in this paragraph. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  26 
function effectively and justly.  The Rawlsian might say, put together the following pieces of 
justice as fairness: first, guarantees in the first principle of freedom of conscience; second, the 
likelihood that there would be some overlap in practice between semiotic justice and the 
guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties; third, the difference principle; fourth, the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity operating at the legislative stage.  The Rawlsian might 
ask, why is that set of factors not good enough to ensure that they cultural liberties actually have 
their fair value? These guarantees, the Rawlsian might insist, should be plenty to ensure that 
everyone has the best chance to participate in culture that they possibly can have, consistent with 
the other requirements of justice.  For instance, the fair equality of opportunity likely requires the 
enactment of anti-trust laws at the legislative stage.  Fair equality of opportunity is precisely 
about the equal opportunity to fully and adequately develop and exercise the first and second 
moral powers, so, if the description that I have provided above of the culture industries is 
accurate, it would likely also require the legislature to adopt anti-trust-like laws designed to 
counteract accumulations of cultural power. What difference does it make to put this into the 
constitution, rather than to leave it in the legislative stage?   
  I will answer this objection by looking to the reasons that Rawls offers for treating the 
fair equality of the political liberties as a constitutional essential.  I will argue that the reasons for 
including semiotic justice in the first principle are just as compelling as the reasons that Rawls 
offers for the political liberties, and that these reasons provide a plausible rationale for 
distinguishing the cultural liberties from other basic liberties, the fair value of which will be 
provided for after the constitutional stage.   
  Why is it that Rawls’s fair value proviso for the equal political liberties needs to be part 
of the first principle, rather than postponed to the legislative stage?  Rawls suggests that the Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  27 
political liberties are of special importance, because “unless the fair value of these liberties is 
approximately preserved, just background institutions are unlikely to be either established or 
maintained.”
96  In other words, if the fair value of the political liberties is not guaranteed from 
the get-go, it will be difficult or impossible for a society to set up the background institutions 
necessary for the first and second principles to be realized.  The special treatment of the equal 
political liberties is not because “participation by everyone in democratic self-government is 
regarded as the preeminent good for fully autonomous citizens.”
97  Indeed, in the modern world, 
these liberties are bound to be less meaningful to most citizens than are the other basic liberties.
98  
Rather, the fair value of the political liberties must be guaranteed as part of the first principle 
“because it is essential in order to establish just legislation and also to make sure that the fair 
political process specified by the constitution is open to everyone on a basis of rough equality.”
99  
By guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties at the outset, before the legislative stage is 
reached, a society can ensure that everyone will be able to fairly participate in the legislative 
process.  If all citizens are able to have their voices heard by the legislature, this will ensure that 
“the other basic liberties are not merely formal.”
100  Like Chief Justice Warren’s description of 
the right to vote freely as “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,”
101 or John Hart 
Ely’s advocacy of “a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review” that is “entirely 
supportive of . . . the underlying premises of the American system of representative 
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democracy,”
102 the fair value of the equal political liberties is particularly urgent because it 
makes the political system work, which in turn ensures that the other basic liberties will be 
realized.  The legislative stage cannot take care of the fair value of the political liberties if access 
to that stage was not itself fair.  The reasons for treating the political liberties proviso as part of 
the first principle, and hence as part of the constitutional essentials, seem to boil down to the 
claim that it is “more urgent to settle” the fair value of the political liberties than of the other 
basic liberties.
103 
  My response to this objection has two prongs.  In addition to explaining why semiotic 
justice is urgent and it is a constitutional essential, my response also engages with the non-liberal 
or anti-liberal concern that by basing my approach to cultural rights on a political conception of 
the person, I am subordinating culture to politics.  The first prong of my response runs as 
follows: the contours of culture shape what is politically possible.  Certain forms of life appear as 
“necessary” or “impossible” because of settlement of both politics and culture.
104  At the very 
                                                 
102 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88 (1980). 
103 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 49.  This is one of the four grounds that Rawls offers for 
distinguishing the constitutional essentials from the requirements of the second principle.  The 
other grounds, which are not as clearly invoked by Rawls’s explanation of why the fair value of 
the political liberties is part of the first principle, are that “[t]he two principles apply to different 
stages in the application of principles and identify two distinct roles of the basic structure,” that 
“[i]t is far easier to tell when those essentials are realized,” and that “[i]t seems possible to gain 
agreement on what those essentials should be, not in every detail, of course, but in the main 
outlines.”  RAWLS, supra note 3, at 49. 
104 See UNGER, supra note 62, at 564 (“There are stock situations and—at least so far as these 
current means of expression go—stock responses to them.  A table of correspondences arises 
between what people feel, or are supposed to be capable of feeling, in the recurrent 
circumstances of social life and the combined ways of acting, talking, and looking that convey 
the subjective response.”); see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: 
PRAGMATISM UNBOUND 49 (2007) (“Every culture must draw the line between the alterable 
features of social life and the enduring character of human existence.  When we understate the 
extent to which the whole order of society and culture represents a frozen politics . . . we become 
the slaves of our own unrecognized creations, to which we bow down as if they were natural and 
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least, the interpretation and assessment of “complex social and economic information” that the 
parties carry out at the legislative stage will depend to a large extent on what arrangements the 
legislators think are impossible or necessary, which will in turn depend on the prevailing cultural 
arrangements.
105   
  For instance, suppose that all (or almost all) of cultural expression in given society is 
characterized by expressions of the beliefs that “the relation of male to female is that of natural 
superior to natural inferior”
106 and that “a man’s and a woman’s temperance differ.”
107  Against 
such a cultural backdrop, would it be possible for cooperating members of society to conclude 
that gender is “fixed natural characteristic[] . . . used as grounds for assigning unequal basic 
rights, or allowing some persons only lesser opportunities” such that the position that the 
characteristic of gender specifies is a “point[] of view from which the basic structure must be 
judged”?
108  It seems likely that, if the cultural understanding of gender were thick enough, there 
would not be any reason to see gendered differences in distribution as requiring any sort of 
special scrutiny.  If all of the least advantaged members of a society turned out to be women, this 
would not provide any reason for suspicion about the justice of the basic structure: women are 
naturally ruled by men, so it should not come as any surprise if most government offices are held 
by men.  Furthermore, this difference might be seen to be to the advantage of women: their 
                                                 
105 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 48. 
106 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254
b13-15 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998).  In Janet Halley’s 
terminology, this might be described as the belief that m > f.  See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT 
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17 (2006). 
107 ARISTOTLE, supra note 106, at 1277
b20. In Janet Halley’s terminology, this might be 
described as the belief that m/f.  See HALLEY, supra note 106, at 18. 
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temperament is fundamentally different from that of men, and they do not benefit from offices 
that require them to lead public lives.
109   
  In such a society, claims about gender would not present themselves as political claims.  
Indeed, the political discourse of the hypothetical society may be completely devoid of any 
discussion of gender.  Claims about gender would instead present themselves as “general 
commonsense facts of human psychology,”
110 and as straightforward truths about the world.
111  
Perhaps Rawls’s political conception of the person in its articulation through the two principles 
of justice could solve much of this problem.  The use of primary goods to measure welfare in the 
difference principle should mean that women at least are guaranteed access to as many primary 
goods as men.
112  And the first part of the second principle will at least ensure that a system of 
“careers open to the talents” prevails, and will also ensure that women who wish to purse the 
talents necessary for a career that requires them have access to resources like education 
necessary to do so.
113  The first principle will also guarantee that all of the basic liberties are, at 
                                                 
109 My description of a hypothetical society is, obviously, very simplified relative to any real 
human society, but I hope that it nevertheless illustrates how culture can inform what is possible 
in politics without itself being explicitly political. 
110 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 101. 
111 See supra note 79 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon’s description of “[m]ale power [as] a myth 
that makes itself true”). 
112 Strict Marxists might think that this, by itself, should solve any problems of gender inequality, 
such inequalities being merely super-structural expressions of underlying economic inequalities.  
But Marxist-Feminists such as Selma James recognize that “[r]acism and sexism train[] us to 
acquire and develop certain capabilities at the expense of all others” and “[t]hen these acquired 
capabilities are taken to be our nature and fix our functions for life, and fix also the quality of our 
mutual relations,” such that “planting cane or tea is not a job for white people and changing 
nappies is not a job for men and beating children is not violence.”  JAMES, supra note 60, at 14. 
113 The fair equality of opportunity requires that 
supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the 
same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should 
have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the 
class into which they are born and develop until the age of reason.  In all parts of Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  31 
the least, formally open to women as well as men.  But ensuring that these liberties have their 
fair value to women seems much harder to do: women might not participate in public cultural 
expression but, the hypothetical society might say, there is no reason that this is unfair; it is 
simply a reflection of the lesser talent of women, who have the rights to write novels and act in 
plays but simply choose not to do so because of their feminine temperament or their lack of 
talent.  If it so happens that, over time, it becomes harder and harder for women to participate in 
shaping the culture because networks that control access to cultural production are controlled by 
men who share the background cultural beliefs about gender, this may be no cause for concern, 
because the people getting shut out from cultural production are the people with less talent.
114  At 
the legislative stage, when the legislators are making complex inferences about social and 
economic facts, it is difficult to see how justice as fairness might adequately exclude the cultural 
background that shapes beliefs about the reality of gender.
115  Perhaps the presence of women in 
politics, encouraged by the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties, would solve 
this.  But I see no reason why that would necessarily be the case: the thick cultural belief about 
                                                                                                                                                            
society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for 
those similarly motivated and endowed. 
RAWLS, supra note 3, at 44.   
114 The Rawlsian objector might step in here and say, “wait a minute! That accumulation of 
power seems to violate fair equality of opportunity.”  But I think that in a society that operates 
with a definition of “native endowments” that sees gender as part of one’s endowment of talent 
to accomplish particular aims, the hypothetical society’s interpretation of fair equality of 
opportunity may be permissible.  To avoid running afoul of the difference principle, it might at 
least be necessary for women to have other opportunities open to them, but this is perfectly 
possible.  Women might, for instance, have opportunities that men do not have to excel in 
domesticity. 
115 Even if parties to the original position think that, put together, these constitutional constraints 
would solve at least the worst problems of the Aristotelian ideology of gender that I described, as 
long as they think that there is some reasonable chance that the ideology might sustain itself in 
the face of these safeguards, they might be hesitant to proceed without some further guarantee 
that the cultural liberties really have their fair value for everyone in society.  See Rawls, supra 
note 3, at 102 (“Their responsibility as trustees for citizens so regarded does not allow them to 
gamble with the basic rights and liberties of those citizens.”). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  32 
gender that I described applies equally to all domains of the hypothetical society.  Women may 
participate in government in this society, and may even think of themselves as political equals of 
men, but may remain committed to the social inequality of men and women.
116   
  Now, perhaps this hypothetical society is not so bad; at the very least, with all of its 
constitutional safeguards in place, it looks like the sort of decent hierarchical society that Rawls 
thinks liberal societies should tolerate.
117  But it seems hard to believe that this is a society that 
satisfies the requirements of liberal justice, and it certainly looks unattractive to anyone 
committed to sex equality “in the sense of parity of rank among [sex-defined] social groups.”
118  
Without a constitutional guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties, clearly spelling out 
that the liberties of participating in culture really should have roughly the same worth for all 
citizens, regardless of what we happen to think of their temperaments.
119  Constitutionalizing 
semiotic justice matters because it will prevent trade-offs from taking place between the worth of 
cultural liberties and the worth of other basic liberties.  Just as securing the fair value of the 
political liberties is particularly urgent, so too is ensuring the fair value of the cultural liberties.  
This is not because guaranteeing semiotic justice will immediately solve the problems of sex 
inequality in my hypothetical society; rather, it is because the cultural liberties are, like the 
political liberties, particularly useful in this situation.  First, they are particularly useful because 
they are necessary for citizens to develop the second moral power, as I have argued above.  
Second, my hypothetical society is premised on cultural beliefs about a culture where a certain 
set of cultural beliefs about the world (that are not explicitly political beliefs) make only a small 
                                                 
116 Cf. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 2 (2d ed. 2007). 
117 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 62-70 (1999). 
118 MACKINNON, supra note 116, at 2. 
119 This might not solve all of the problems in my hypothetical society.  For instance, there 
would still be the question of what it means to be worth “the same.”   Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  33 
set of social arrangements appear to be possible to both citizens and legislators.  Guaranteeing 
the fair value of the cultural liberties makes it possible for members of a society to have a chance 
to challenge the culture that makes some social arrangements seem possible and others 
impossible. 
  This leads directly to the second prong of my response to the Rawlsian objection.  The 
fair value of cultural liberties is particularly urgent because guaranteeing such liberties is 
necessary to create the conditions necessary for political philosophy to do its work.  The political 
philosophizing that gives rise to the political conception of the person is worked up from the 
“public political culture of a democratic society, its basic political texts (constitutions and 
declarations of human rights), and in the historical tradition of the interpretation of those 
texts.”
120  This means that if there are blind spots in the historical traditions in which justice as 
fairness goes to work, justice as fairness is likely to suffer from similar oversights.
121  
Furthermore, as a rationalizing endeavor,
122 political philosophy is ill suited to discover these 
oversights.
123  However, a commitment to making culture open, to allowing the conditions 
against which political philosophy grows up to be contested by all of the people of a cooperating 
                                                 
120 RAWLS, supra note 3, at 19. 
121 One piece of evidence for this claim is that Rawls’s theory of justice has frequently been 
criticized (sometimes fairly, sometimes not) for failing to pay sufficient attention to global 
justice, see, e.g., Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 
251 (1999), women’s rights, see, e.g., Susan Miller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished 
Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2004), disability, see, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 30 PHI. TOPICS 133 (2002), 
and obligations to non-human animals, see, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 
325-407 (2006), all topics that have, arguably, often been overlooked in the history of political 
society in the United States. 
122 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing how philosophy can play the role of 
reconciliation, “calm[ing] our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing 
us the way in which its institutions, when properly understood from a philosophical point of 
view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form”) 
123 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 92 (1989). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  34 
society, provides an avenue to address these oversights.  Interventions in culture can bring to 
light previously unrecognized ways of life,
124 providing resources with which individuals may 
develop their conceptions of the good and showing philosophers where political philosophy 
should play its “realistically utopian” role, “probing the limits of practical political 
possibility.”
125  As Richard Rorty writes, “pain is nonlinguistic: it is what we human beings have 
that ties us to the nonlanguage-using beasts.  So victims of cruelty, people who are suffering, do 
not have much in the way of a language.”
126  In other words, even if a political society is deeply 
committed to addressing the problem of suffering whenever it encounters it, it may be difficult to 
notice suffering when it occurs if it is not expressed in the shared space of culture and language.  
“So the job of putting their situation into language is going to have to be done for [the victims of 
suffering] by somebody else.  The liberal novelist, poet, or journalist is good at that.  The liberal 
theorist usually is not.”
127  Cultural participation is the sort of expression that creates the 
conditions of awareness that political philosophy can then work to incorporate, seeking out 
voices that cannot be understood in the realm of political philosophy unless they are first 
articulated in cultural space.
128  Guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties is of similar 
                                                 
124 See RORTY, supra note 123, at 94 (explaining that “‘literature’ (in the older and narrower 
sense), as well as ethnography and journalism, is doing a lot” for freedom and equality); see also 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) (discussing culture as a semiotic 
system). 
125 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 4. 
126 RORTY, supra note 123, at 94. 
127 RORTY, supra note 123, at 94; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court 2006 Term 
Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 97 (2007) (“Who could possibly say that laws against miscegenation impose equal 
disabilities on both black and white?  Only someone who stands so far away from real life that 
the suffering of exclusion cannot be seen. . . .  The [Capabilities Approach] says: Don’t be like 
that. Get some experience. Learn about the world. Use your imagination.”). 
128 Julie Cohen discusses how the Gadmerian, “to and fro” play of culture, which is “neither 
entirely random nor wholly ordered . . . supplies the unexpected inputs to creative processes, 
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urgency to guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties because the cultural background 
against which politics works, and which informs its conception of the person as well as providing 
it with general commonsense knowledge with which to understand the world, determines what 
sort of institutional arrangements appear reasonable from the perspective of politics and which 
do not.  Guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties is essential in order to establish an 
understanding of what the world is like that the members of a cooperating society can agree on 
and to ensure that the ability to develop and pursue conceptions of the good is a real opportunity 
to do so, rather than merely an opportunity to endorse the prevailing conceptions of the good in a 
cooperative society.
129 
  Non-liberals might remain concerned that my argument still boils down to politics in the 
end, but my argument does so only because it is a political theory, and speaking the voice of 
politics, as a sphere that is semi-autonomous from culture, just as culture is semi-autonomous 
from it, requires returning to the space of politics after exploring the world of culture, using its 
insights as a resource to make politics more flexible and inclusive, and speaking of culture 
through politics.  As justice as fairness moves back and forth between considered judgments 
made in a thick social context and considered highly general convictions, it learns from the play 
of cultural life, where conceptions of the good are developed and deployed. 
  The final objection to semiotic justice that I will explore briefly is Rawls’s objection that 
guaranteeing the fair value of basic liberties other than the equal political liberties is socially 
divisive.  The answer to this objection is that this guarantee is not socially divisive.  First, this is 
                                                                                                                                                            
Cohen, supra note 2, at 1191-92.  The unpredictability of culture’s movements in response to 
inputs provides a further resource for destabilizing and rethinking political theory. 
129 Cf. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 330 (“The guarantee of fair value for 
the political liberties is included in the first principle of justice because it is essential in order to 
establish just legislation and also to make sure that the fair political process specified by the 
constitution is open to everyone on a basis of rough equality.”). Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  36 
because guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties is particularly urgent, as is 
guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties.  Second, it is not socially divisive because 
semiotic justice does not articulate a preference for certain conceptions of the good rather than 
others within the space of culture that it opens up.  This is not to say that semiotic justice is 
indifferent among all possible conceptions of the good; it certainly excludes conceptions of the 
good that, for instance, require a closed or static culture.  However, as illustrated by Figure 1, 
within the space of cultural contestation, semiotic justice commits to neutrality among competing 
conceptions of the good (to the extent that such conceptions do not clash with the requirement of 
semiotic justice itself).  Justice as fairness identifies certain “worthy” forms of life and provides 
sufficient space within itself for those ways of life while also excluding other forms of life.
130  
This is permissible for Rawls because the exclusion of some ways of life is based on a political 
conception of justice that is, “or can be, shared by citizens regarded as free and equal” and 
“do[es] not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine.”
131  Similarly, 
the preferences that semiotic justice does have for some forms of life rather than others are 
rooted in the political conception of the person as having the first and second moral powers 
rather than in any commitment to a particular comprehensive conception of the good.
 132  
Semiotic justice sets up a space of culture, and while it may foreclose the development of 
conceptions of good outside of that space, it commits to allowing all of the different conceptions 
of the good that are able to fit within that space to play out against one another.
133 
                                                 
130 RAWLS, supra note 23, at 174. 
131 RAWLS, supra note 23, at 176. 
132 I will return to the tricky question of how easily semiotic justice will actually be able to 
maintain neutrality of aim in the context of copyright law in Part III, infra. 
133 One additional question that a Rawlsian might ask of my theory is whether it is possible to 
maintain a distinction between cultural and political liberties and other basic liberties.  Answer: 
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Fig. 1.  Cultural Space in Semiotic Justice 
 
D.  Implications for Rawls’s Political Conception of the Person 
  Does this account of culture require modifications to Rawls’s political conception of the 
person?  Answer: Yes, it requires revisions to Rawls’s account of how freely people chose their 
own ends under reasonably favorable democratic conditions.  For Rawls, the person is 
conceptualized as a free rational person reaching agreement with other free rational persons, and 
is understood to reach reciprocal agreement as a citizen with other citizens.  What the person 
cares about is the establishment of the right sort of political arrangements, full stop.  The 
reciprocal cooperation that the members of a cooperating society agree upon is cooperation as 
citizens.  Elevating cultural liberties to the level of a constitutional essential reflects a concern 
with something other than citizenship; on par with the political aims of the Kantian persons is 
now a commitment to creating a space in which people can pursue and revise conceptions of the 
good with each other.  In this way, twisting Rawls’s theory to give extra protection to cultural 
                                                                                                                                                            
respectively, and because of my demonstration of the urgency and usefulness of cultural liberties 
relative to other liberties in this Part. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  38 
liberties and to address the possible problems of semiotic injustice pushes Rawls’s boat out of his 
Kantian harbor.  But perhaps by putting the second moral power on par with the first, Rawls has 
already irretrievably left Kantian waters, with respect to this particular aspect of his political 
theory.  Rawls’s account of the parties to the original position as reciprocal cooperators might 
still be sustained but the reciprocity cannot be simply reciprocity as citizens.
134 
II.  SEMIOTIC JUSTICE OUTSIDE THE ORIGINAL POSITION: A BENCHMARK FOR LAW 
  I now move from the level of ideal political theory down to constitution making, 
legislation, and adjudication, developing an account of how to apply the insights of Part I to a 
world already inhabited by legal and political institutions that shape cultural expression and 
consumption.  In Part I, I developed the claim that a guarantee of “semiotic justice,” providing 
for the fair value of the cultural liberties, is a constitutional essential.  In order for a constitution 
to be legitimation worthy, this proviso must be satisfied.
135  This tells us that, if we were to draft 
the United States Constitution today, we would probably write a very different copyright clause 
than what we have now, if we wanted a legitimation-worthy constitution.
136  However, 
                                                 
134 Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Rawls, Equality, and Democracy, 34 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 203, 241 
(“Arguably, Rawls laid the groundwork for this alternative in the ways he broke from Kant (TJ, 
256).  Rawls assumed that ‘[t]he person’s choice as a noumenal self . . . to be a collective one’ 
(TJ, 257).  My suggestion is that he failed to follow through when he treated individualized 
natural attributes, possession of the two moral powers, as the basis of people’s equality.  Rather, 
fundamental equality of noumenal beings engaged in collective choices lies in people’s basic 
relational practices, of which communicative action provides a morally generative instance.  By 
beginning with communicative action, this second approach does not reject the significance of 
the two moral powers but sees their moral relevance as lying precisely within cooperative 
ventures (of communication action or societal cooperation).”). 
135 As Frank Michelman notes, “[a] legitimation-worthy constitution, if we have one, . . . does 
important moral work” because “[i]t allows for a kind of proceduralization of judgments 
regarding the moral permissibility of collaboration in the enforcement of laws of uncertain and 
disputed moral or other merits.”  Frank I. Michelman, Constitutions and Capabilities (manuscript 
at 6). 
136 The current copyright clause says that Congress shall have the power “To promote the 
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determining whether the legal system of the United State on the whole provides for rough 
equality in the access to and use of cultural liberties could be very difficult, as there are many 
areas of law that affect cultural expression and that interact complexly, and “rough equality” is 
itself a rather ambiguous phrase. 
  In any event, the proviso of semiotic justice might be more useful to us not as an 
indicator of whether or not the American constitution is legitimation worthy, but instead as a 
guide that we might keep in mind as conscientious judges or legislators working to make a 
constitution that is legitimation-worthy or, in the absence of a constitution that can be made 
legitimation-worthy, working to implement and apply laws that are morally justifiable in 
themselves.  In this way, semiotic justice can provide “a useful template against which to assess 
our achievements” and “a norm against to which to assess what we have neglected and failed to 
protect.”
137  This is not to say that semiotic justice provides straightforward advice to judges 
about how to decide copyright cases, as judges operate under many other constraints (including 
the text of the copyright statute, Congressional intent, precedent, constitutional law, and other 
fields of law that conflict with copyright law).  Instead, semiotic justice offers guidance to the 
                                                                                                                                                            
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Of 
course, the proviso of semiotic justice might be written into the constitution elsewhere, serving 
as a constraint on this grant of power to the Congress.  Indeed, the First Amendment might be 
understood as enacting, at least in part, the proviso as part of the Constitution when it says that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  Nevertheless, as the First Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, it 
does not guarantee the fair value of the cultural liberties.  Sufficient evidence for this point is 
provided by the fact that the accumulations of cultural power that I provided in Part I as 
examples of how the cultural liberties might be denied their fair value arose in the context of 
American constitutional and copyright law. 
137 Nussbaum, supra note 127, at 8. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  40 
political system as a whole (including to citizens qua citizens) on what the system of laws 
regulating and incentivizing culture is doing well and how it might be improved.
138 
  Finally, the semiotic justice proviso settles some aspects of the legal and political system, 
by ruling out a set of possible arrangements of the basic structure that violate the requirement 
that the cultural liberties should have roughly equal values for all members of a society.  
However, within the set of arrangements of the basic structure that satisfy this requirement, 
semiotic justice is indifferent.  Thus, semiotic justice leaves a moderately broad range of freedom 
for political actors to shape the space of cultural expression (within the other constraints of 
justice as fairness, including the requirement of neutrality of aim), provided that in doing so they 
do not threaten the requirement of fair equality of opportunity to participate in shaping culture 
that is embodied in semiotic justice. 
III. SEMIOTIC JUSTICE IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
  In this part, I will bring semiotic justice to bear on presently existing American copyright 
law and the international system of copyright, assess particular legal dilemmas, and explore what 
answers to these dilemmas semiotic justice would suggest. In this section, I will designate the 
Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness as modified by the proviso of semiotic justice as “SJ.”  
That is, when I say “SJ,” I mean {Rawls’s first principle of justice, as modified by the proviso of 
the fair equality of the equal political liberties and the proviso of the fair equality of the cultural 
liberties} plus {Rawls’s second principle of justice}.
139  On the other hand, when I say “the 
                                                 
138 Cf. WILARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF 
VIEW: 9 LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 20, 41 (1961) (“[O]ur statements about the external 
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.”). 
139 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating Rawls’s first and second principles of 
justice); supra note 43 and accompanying text (stating the proviso of the fair value of the equal 
political liberties); supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (stating the proviso of semiotic 
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semiotic justice proviso,” I mean simply the guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties, 
by itself.  In this section, I will focus on domestic United States copyright law, taking the United 
States as a society of the sort of society that Rawls saw his political account of justice as 
addressing itself to.  Copyright is certainly not the only area of law to which SJ applies, or even 
the only field of intellectual property law that is of considerable importance in shaping the 
contours of the public facility of culture.
 140  Furthermore, there are many uses of copyright law 
that do not directly touch on the cultural expressive liberties that SJ (or at least the proviso of 
semiotic justice in particular) is concerned with.
 141  Nevertheless, the regulation and promotion 
of cultural expression remains central to the agenda of copyright law, which provides protection 
to books, magazine, newspaper, and blog articles, poetry, plays, music, architecture, 
choreography, movies, and visual art.
142 
                                                 
140 For instance, trademark can provide protection for fictional characters.  See, e.g., Walt Disney 
Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that Disney owned valid trademarks 
in Mickey and Minnie Mouse), modified by 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  Another instance is 
the sui generis protection for fashion in the European Union.  See Council Regulation 6/2002, 
art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1, 4 (EC).  Sui generis fashion protection has also been proposed for the 
United States in the Design Piracy Prohibition Act.  See Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 
2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a), (d) (2007); Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. 
§ 2(a), (d) (2007). 
141 For instance, copyright extends to a cataloging and classification of dental procedures, 
American Dental Association v. Delta Dental Plans Association, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997), 
maps, at least when the idea embodied in a map is capable of a variety of expressions, Mason v. 
Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992), computer software, Softel, Inc. v. Dragon 
Medical and Scientific Communications, Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Council 
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 1, 
1991 O.J. (L-122) 42 (EU Software Directive) (“In accordance with the provisions of this 
Directive, Member States shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works 
within the meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.”), 
and collections of automobile prices, CCC Information Services, Inc., v. Maclean Hunter Market 
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).  But see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 342 (1988) (“It is an oversimplification to think that some genres of 
intellectual property cannot carry personality.”). 
142 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 1187 (“Copyright scholars have long recognized that discourses 
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  Before exploring particular problems within copyright law, a preliminary question is 
whether SJ permits, requires, or prohibits copyright law altogether.  The proviso of semiotic 
justice permits but does not require liberal political societies to enact a system of copyright.  A 
copyright system that gives rise to a political economy that allows some individuals to exercise 
markedly more control over the cultural space than others is certainly out (or, in any event, either 
such a system of copyright is barred, or some other part of the basic structure that, combined 
with the copyright system gives rise to such exclusion and that is itself a necessary condition for 
it, is barred).  A system that provided no protection for intellectual property might also be barred 
by the proviso of semiotic justice, if, for instance, it meant that only people with sufficient 
wealth to sustain themselves independently of writing are able to write novels or record music, as 
this might violate the instantiation of the liberal principle of equality of opportunity in the 
semiotic justice proviso.  However, so long as a system of copyright law (or the absence of such 
a system) does not violate the fair value of cultural liberties, the proviso of semiotic justice 
allows a broad range of legal arrangement with respect to the rights afforded to authors of 
cultural works.  SJ (consisting of the proviso of semiotic justice plus Rawls’s principles of 
justice) might have more to say about the particular schemes of intellectual property.  The 
difference principle would, for instance, guide political societies to adopt whatever set of 
political arrangements, including a system of intellectual property, provides the greatest 
advantage to the least advantaged members of society.  Again SJ will provide a significant 
degree of freedom to liberal political societies to choose what forms of intellectual property they 
wish to protect, so long as the semiotic justice proviso and the other limitations of political 
justice are abided by. 
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  If SJ allows for a broad range of legal arrangements with respect to the rights of authors 
of cultural work, what does it have to say about a system of copyright once it has been enacted?  
Particularly, what might SJ have to say about existing American system of copyright?  Given 
that the United States has already made the decision to use a system of copyright to promote 
cultural production and to reward producers of cultural material, SJ suggests several principles 
that might guide decisions about how to develop copyright protection within that system.  
A.  Elements of Copyrightable Subject Matter 
  While SJ may not require that a society set up a system of copyright (or for that matter, 
any other particular system to encourage cultural production, like a prize system or a system of 
government grants), once a society has decided to set up a copyright system with the aim of 
encouraging people to create cultural goods, SJ is concerned that all members of society be 
equally positioned to benefit from this system.  This concern is particularly acute if the copyright 
system provides big rewards to individuals who create cultural products that are read, listened to, 
or watched by a particularly large number of consumers, since such a system may be particularly 
susceptible to the aggrandizement of cultural capital in a small number of hands (as cultural 
influence leads to the accumulation of wealth which then loops back into still more accumulation 
of cultural power).  Once such a copyright system is up and running, it should (1) adopt a broad 
view of what expression counts as “cultural” expression in order to leave the largest possible 
zone of free cultural play, (2) aim to ensure that the including certain forms of expression in the 
copyright system does not compound existing inequalities, and (3) avoid favoring one favoring 
the expression of one conception of the good over another, except to the extent necessary to Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  44 
guarantee the fair value of the cultural liberties (and comply with the other requirements of 
Rawls’s first and second principles).
 143   
  One concrete scenario where this prescriptive advice plays out is the field of copyright 
protection for useful articles.  In Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,
144 
the Second Circuit held that a RIBBON bike rack, made of bent metal tubing, was not eligible 
for copyright protection, because “the form of the rack [was] influenced in significant measure 
by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements [could not] be said to be conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian elements.”
145  The owner of Brandir, who created the bike rack, 
was a sculptor who created wire sculptures out of “continuous undulating piece[s] of wire.”
146  
When a friend informed him that his wire sculptures would make good bike racks, he made some 
changes to one of his wire sculptures to make it a better bike rack, including widening the upper 
loops of the wire to allow bikes to be parked “under . . . as well as over” the rack’s curves.
147  
The court determined that, because “the ultimate design [of the RIBBON Rack was] as much the 
result of utilitarian processes as aesthetic choices,” it was, in its final form, “the product of 
industrial design” rather than a work of minimalist sculpture.
 148   
  SJ views the outcome of Brandir as inconsistent with the fair value of cultural liberties 
for two reasons.  First, Brandir expresses a preference for one form of cultural expression (non-
utilitarian art) to another (industrial design).  Both forms of expression fall within the broad 
conception of culture upon which SJ is premised, and, given a background system of copyright 
                                                 
143 See supra fig. 1. 
144 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
145 Brandir International, Inc., 834 F.2d at 1147; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (subjecting 
“useful articles” to a test of “separability” of their utilitarian and “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features” as a prerequisite for copyright protection). 
146 Brandir International, Inc., 834 F.2d at 1146. 
147 Brandir International, Inc., 834 F.2d at 1146. 
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rules that roughly meet the requirements of SJ, extending copyright protection to either form of 
expression would not prevent the realization of the fair value of other cultural liberties.  Both 
forms of expression, therefore, fall within the zone of free cultural play, and SJ’s commitment to 
neutrality within this zone suggests that copyright protection should not denied to the RIBBON 
Rack simply because its design was influenced by utilitarian impulses as well as creative 
impulses.  Second, recognizing minimalist sculpture but not industrial design as eligible for 
copyright protection may compound inequalities.  It seems a reasonable assumption that creating 
minimalist sculpture professionally is a more elite and exclusive activity than industrial design: 
fine artists have often received extensive formal or informal training and have accumulated 
significant cultural capital in the form of knowledge about how to create art that satisfies the 
demands of a rarefied market.  There are likely more people who design objects with some 
utilitarian ends in mind than there are professional fine artists.
149  Just because industrial 
designers have some utilitarian objective in mind does not imply that they do not simultaneously 
have aesthetic objectives, as Brandir illustrates.  In order to keep the field of cultural production 
as open as possible to as many people as possible, and to prevent the aggrandizement of cultural 
power in a small number of professional artists working as taste-makers, SJ would resist the 
holding in Brandir, preferring instead a test for separability closer to Judge Newman’s temporal 
displacement test in his dissent in Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
150 which would 
provide protection to articles that “stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate 
from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”
151  Such a test would be acceptable from the 
standpoint of SJ because it draws a significantly broader line around the zone of cultural play, 
                                                 
149 Note that the disparity between high art and industrial design is one of cultural capital, not 
necessarily a financial disparity. 
150 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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letting in any object that a participant in the cultural space can understand as a form of cultural 
expression.  Cutting out forms of expression from this zone
152 that ordinary participants cannot 
understand as cultural also does not undercut the rationale for constitutionalizing the guarantee 
of the fair value of cultural speech, because the ability of expression to change a cultural system 
in a manner that might correct errors in the political system depends on engaging with culture 
and speaking in a manner that can be heard by other participants in culture.
153  (In other words, 
uttering nonsense is unlikely to effect any change to a cultural space, unless I can show other 
participants in the space how uttering nonsense somehow engages with that cultural space.) 
  SJ’s take on copyright for useful articles can be extended to state that the principle 
announced by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. is a high point in 
American copyright law.
154  Holmes proclaimed that 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of 
the narrowest and most obvious limits.  At the one extreme, some works of genius 
would be sure to miss appreciation.  Their very novelty would make them 
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author 
spoke.  It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya 
or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the 
first time.  At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed 
                                                 
152 Cutting a form of expression off from the zone of cultural free play does not mean that the 
expression receives no legal or constitutional protections.  In the American system of 
constitutional law, speech that cannot be understood by ordinary participants in the cultural space 
as “culture” may still be afforded First Amendment protections.  All that cutting off means is that 
the fair value of the form of expression does not need to be guaranteed as a constitutional 
essential. 
153 Cf. RORTY, supra note 123. 
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to a public less educated than the judge.  Yet if they command the interest of any 
public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not 
an aesthetic and educational value, and the taste of any public is not to be treated 
with contempt.
155 
Although not articulated systematically, this expresses the core of SJ’s commitment to neutrality 
within the zone of cultural play—copyright is not set aside for just one type of art, and it strives 
to avoid denigrating the potential value of any form of cultural expression that is compatible with 
a guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties. 
  A question might be raised about SJ’s stance on Brandir and Bleistein.  What stance 
would SJ take with respect to line-drawing in the Brandir case if the distinction was not between 
high art and industrial design or kitsch but was instead between, for example, representational 
and non-representational art?  What would SJ say about a white canvas hung in an art gallery 
being denied copyright protection on the basis of the idea/expression distinction while a portrait 
is granted protection?
156  Answer: SJ would hope to avoid affording protection to some forms of 
expression and not other forms of expression when both engage in the cultural space and avoid 
explicitly violating the requirements of SJ.  But at a certain point, SJ acknowledges, we will have 
to draw lines to determine what expression receives copyright protection and what doesn’t—that 
is what law does.  SJ must remain as neutral as it possibly can among expressions of different 
conceptions of good in the space that it opens up for cultural expression, but when it is necessary 
to draw lines in order to keep the system administrable, SJ may do so.  What SJ may not do, 
however, is draw lines in a way that exacerbates existing inequalities.  For this reason, a line 
between representational and non-representational art (assuming that both forms of art were 
                                                 
155 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52. 
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similar in prestige and exclusiveness) is not as worrying as drawing a line between high art and 
industrial design, or drawing a line that may have gendered effects, like excluding quilts from 
intellectual property protection.
157  SJ should try to avoid cutting out any form of cultural 
expression from the guarantee of the fair value of cultural liberties.  Nonetheless, in some 
circumstances, SJ will need to draw lines, guaranteeing the fair value of some forms of 
expression but not of others.  Provided that this line-drawing really is necessary for the 
preservation of SJ (either the proviso of semiotic justice or the first or second principle of 
justice), the line-drawing is permissible unless it exacerbates existing inequalities (in a way that 
threatens the fair value of the cultural liberties). 
  This definition of when line-drawing is permissible is another way of saying that SJ will 
allow the fair some cultural liberties to be restricted for the sake of other liberties when doing so 
accords with public reason, satisfying the Rawlsian requirement of neutrality of aim.  Thus, for 
instance, SJ might disallow an attempt to prevent people from watching pornography by denying 
copyright protection to pornographic films and photographs.  This outcome is not, however, 
obvious—if the provision of copyright protection for pornography shapes the cultural facility in 
such a way that a particular group of people, women, for instance, or many women, are 
prevented or inhibited from fully realizing the second moral power, SJ might require 
conditioning the enforcement of copyright protections for pornography “for which the 
consensuality of the performers cannot be demonstrated.”
158  This is an instance where SJ needs 
to foreclose the expression of certain conceptions of the good because those conceptions, by their 
                                                 
157 See Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & LAW 431, 443-44 (2006).  I would like to thank Julie Cohen for suggesting this 
example. 
158 Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
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very expression, prevent the cultural liberties (and, in the case of pornography, possibly the 
political liberties
159), from having their fair value.
160 
  Readers might object to SJ’s treatment of the subject matter of copyright and its 
valorization of Bleistein on the grounds that “the postmodernist critique of authorship, 
originality, and progress” demonstrates that SJ is not capable of really maintaining neutrality 
when drawling lines to determine what cultural expression has its fair value guaranteed and what 
does not.
161  This objection claims that while SJ can justify its decisions to include certain forms 
of cultural expression from the guarantee of the fair value of cultural liberties on the basis of its 
political conception of the person that gives rise to the proviso of semiotic justice, this “political” 
basis for exclusion really just reflects a decision at the outset of the process of articulating the 
proviso of semiotic justice to treat some ways of life as worthy and not others.
162   
  The response to this objection is two-fold.  First, as a constructivist political theory, SJ 
fully acknowledges that its decisions to include or exclude certain forms of expression are, at 
root, based on a political embrace of certain conceptions of the good rather than the other, but SJ 
incorporates a very large number of such conceptions, such that almost any member of a liberal 
society will be satisfied with the protections afforded their cultural rights by SJ.  Second, SJ 
operates through a process of reflective equilibrium, going back and forth between its specific 
                                                 
159 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1985). 
160 Note that this claim is stronger than the claim made about drawing lines between, or example, 
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161 Cohen, supra note 2, at 1164. 
162 Cf. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 174 (noting that justice as fairness as 
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judgments about whether particular forms of expression must be guaranteed their fair value or 
not and its highly general considered convictions, which enables SJ to open itself to amendment 
and modification.  While no theory of culture and copyright could articulate an infallible theory 
to explain when copyrights should and should not be enforced, SJ has the advantage of epistemic 
modesty and a willingness to revisit its abstract commitments in light of what it finds when it 
goes out to look at the cultures that inhabit it, and that it inhabits. 
B.  Joint Authorship 
  SJ seeks to ensure that all people experience the fair value of the cultural liberties.  One 
way of doing this is to ensure that as many people as possible have an opportunity to be authors, 
singers, or artists.  This concern plays out in the context of joint authorship.  Thompson v. 
Larson, a case concerning whether Lynn Thomspon, a dramaturg who collaborated closely with 
Jonathan Larson to heavily revise the script for Rent, was a joint author, with Larson, of the 
musical.
163  The Second Circuit determined that Thomspon was not a joint author of Rent, 
although she had contributed material to the play that would, by itself, have been eligible for 
copyright protection.
164  The court held that that joint authorship requires that both authors 
contribute independently copyrightable material to the work and that both parties must intend to 
be co-authors.
165  SJ sees the Thompson rule for joint authorship as unnecessarily limiting the 
number of people who can partake of the incentives for cultural production.  A possible objection 
is that granting more people rights as joint authors will discourage people from becoming full-
fledged authors themselves, since they will be less likely to reap all of the profits for the cultural 
products that they create. However, it seems more likely that adopting a standard of joint 
authorship closer to Nimmer’s proposed standard (that any contribution is sufficient for joint 
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authorship) would provide more equal incentives for people who participate in cultural 
expression as authors and those who do so as editors and revisers.
166  These are all means of 
participating in cultural production and, since SJ aims to ensure that as many people as possible 
have a chance to articulate their conception of the good in the space of culture in some way, SJ 
sees a world in which many people participate some in cultural expression as superior to a world 
in which a few people make many contributions to cultural expression, even if it is true that 
reducing the standard for joint authorship would reduce the incentives for people to become lead 
authors. 
C.  Copyright Duration 
  From the perspective of SJ, the copyright system exists to encourage people to engage in 
cultural production.  At the point that the copyright system restricts the uses to which cultural 
material can be put without providing benefits in the form of encouragement for authors to 
engage in cultural production, SJ will not treat these aspects of the copyright system as necessary 
to preserve the fair value of cultural liberties.  If the restrictions imposed on the ability to engage 
with culture are onerous enough that they inhibit people from engaging in cultural discourse, SJ 
would treat these restrictions as a violation of the fair value of cultural liberties.  In Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the 
duration of copyright to extend from “creation until 70 years after the author’s death.”
167  
Congress extended the term in spite of the fact that “from a rational economic perspective the 
time difference among these periods makes no real difference.”
168  At the same time, extending 
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167 537 U.S. 186, 195-96 (2003). 
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copyright period of protection that, even under conservative assumptions, is worth more than 
99.8% of protection in perpetuity . . . .”).  The majority did not disagree with Breyer’s 
assessment of economic rationality, but simply stated that it was deferring to Congress on the Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  52 
the copyright term by twenty years made it significantly harder for authors to engage with and 
make use of works that would otherwise have fallen into the public domain.
169  Furthermore, the 
CTEA effectively transferred wealth from the public to authors who held copyrights in popular 
works created before the enactment of the CTEA.
170  SJ is suspicious of any such wealth 
transfers, because they are particularly likely to lead to mutually reinforcing accumulations of 
cultural and economic power.  In light of the cost that the CTEA imposed on expression about 
works that would otherwise have fallen into the public domain, the absence of any beneficial 
incentive to create new cultural works, and, particularly, the transfer of wealth to existing 
copyright holders, SJ regards the CTEA as violating the proviso guaranteeing the fair value of 
the cultural liberties. 
D.  Fair Use 
  Given the social and political conditions in which the copyright system is used to 
encourage cultural production and that fair use is used as a mechanism to ensure that the 
copyright system does not itself stifle important cultural expression, SJ sees several aspects of 
fair use as particularly important for the preservation of the fair value of the cultural liberties.
171 
  First, SJ regards privileging creative uses of copyrighted material as valuable, and adopts 
a broad stance of what constitute “creative uses.”  Creative uses are important because the 
purpose of the semiotic justice proviso is to ensure that everyone has a chance to develop, revise, 
and pursue their conception of the good in the public facility of culture.  Doing so requires 
making room for creating in a way that allows a fresh articulation of the good by every member 
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169 See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 175 (2008). 
170 NETANEL, supra note 169, at 182-85. 
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of society, such creativity allowing people to be “big”
172 and also providing resources for both 
culture and politics to renew themselves.
173  This means that, while SJ would urge fair use to 
highly privilege transformative works and parodies, SJ would not require a finding of fair use in 
a case like Sony Corporation of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.,
174 where the use of 
copyrighted material in question (“time shifting” television shows) was not an activity that could 
obviously be classified as creative, expressive, or participatory.
 175  This is not to say that SJ 
would argue that Sony was wrongly decided, but would rather argue that the application of fair 
use to the facts in Sony is not the sort of fair use that SJ requires to be privileged as a matter of 
the constitutional essentials.
176 
  Second, from the perspective of SJ, political uses of copyrighted material are particularly 
important.  Such uses of copyrighted material are of great importance to SJ because such uses are 
instances where both the fair value of the political liberties and the fair value of the cultural 
liberties must be preserved in order to satisfy SJ.  Take the case of Jackson Browne and John 
McCain.  During his presidential campaign, McCain played Browne’s song, “Running on 
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Empty,” during a campaign commercial, after which Browne filed a lawsuit against McCain, 
claiming, inter alia, that he did not want his music to be associated in any way with McCain or 
the Republican party.
177  In this case, the court denied McCain’s motions to dismiss, and 
thereafter the McCain settled the suit with Brown.  However, if the suit had proceeded to trial, SJ 
might (depending on how the facts would have developed) have supported a fair use defense 
brought by McCain.  SJ wants to ensure that cultural capital does not simply allow its holders to 
exercise a monopoly over the political uses of that cultural capital.  Thus, in order to satisfy the 
requirement of the fair value of the cultural liberties, SJ would suggest that courts should 
strongly default to considering political uses of speech to be transformative.
178 
  This is related to the third stance that SJ takes with respect to fair use.  Guaranteeing the 
fair value of the cultural liberties requires shaping the basic structure so as to ensure that people 
who wish to participate in cultural production can effectively engage with the background 
culture into which they deliver their work.
179  Thus, SJ believes that the fair value of cultural 
liberties is potentially at risk when a system of copyright makes it impossible for a potential 
author to effectively engage with cultural works that she wishes to engage in a dialogue.  
Doctrinally, this suggests that SJ would be particularly likely to treat uses as fair when the owner 
of a copyright is unwilling to license it to an author who wishes to engage with the work
180 and 
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would regard a particular broad construction of “potential markets” in the fourth factor of the 
statutory fair use test as potentially violating the proviso of semiotic justice.
181 
IV.  FOUR CONTRASTS 
  In this part, I shift outside of the fairly strict Rawlsian framework within which I operated 
in Parts I and II and compare semiotic justice to other justificatory theories of intellectual 
property (and particularly copyright).
182  I argue that semiotic justice avoids many of the 
problems associated with welfare-based arguments, fairness arguments, personhood arguments, 
and communitarian arguments for copyright.  Particularly, I argue that semiotic justice may 
achieve a degree of common ground that other theoretical approaches to copyright are unable to 
attain because semiotic justice maintains greater neutrality with respect to different substantive 
accounts of what constitutes the good of culture.  As in Part III, I will designate the Rawlsian 
theory of justice as fairness as modified by the proviso of semiotic justice as “SJ.”
183  
  I will compare SJ to several alternative theories of copyright law that have achieved some 
level of acceptance among lawyers and liberal political theorists.
184  The four theories that I will 
address are welfare-based approaches; Lockean, fairness-based approaches; Hegelian, 
personhood-based approaches; and “social planning” approaches that believe intellectual 
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property rights should be used to shape a just and attractive culture.
 185  I am focusing on liberal 
theories in keeping with the use of Rawlsian political theory as an argument within the big tent 
of liberalism and, beyond that, a fighting faith.
186   
  If SJ is successful, it will suggest some possible resolutions to conflicts that are 
embedded in liberal society.  Furthermore, as a Rawlsian theory, I hope that SJ can attract an 
“overlapping consensus” of liberal theories of copyright that will endorse its precepts which are, 
I will argue in the following sections, “thinner” than those of the other theories of copyright.
187 
  As a preliminary, I will mention one further classification of these liberal approaches that 
bears on the arguments for and against each approach.  As I will describe them, three of the 
approaches (welfare, personhood, and culture) are consequentialist with respect to copyright, 
because their force in recommending a particular copyright regime rests on particular outcomes 
of granting copyright protection to expressive works: outcomes that, respectively, promote social 
welfare, protect personhood interests of authors or consumers, or promote the most desirable sort 
of culture.  I also take the most persuasive variants of the labor approach to be consequentialist in 
this respect: recognizing copyright enables authors to recoup earnings from their works. There 
are some versions of the fairness approach that are not consequentialist in this regard, but that 
instead argue that copyright is a matter of natural law, and by virtue of creating an expressive 
work, an author has natural rights to use the work, exclude others from its use, and transfer these 
rights to use and exclude.
188  SJ is non-consequentialist in its requirement of neutrality of aim 
                                                 
185 These theories are derived from William W. Fisher III’s taxonomy of theories of intellectual 
property.  See William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169–73 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001). 
186 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
187 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 32-38 (describing the idea of an overlapping consensus).  
188 See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
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with respect to conceptions of the good, while SJ also has consequentialist elements in that the 
evaluation of whether a particular system of copyright law conflicts with or respects the 
requirement that the fair value of the cultural liberties be honored depends on the practical 
effects of the regime of copyright law on expressive cultural liberties.  
A.  The Welfare Argument for Copyright 
  The most dominant theory of copyright in academic literature today argues that copyright 
should be designed to maximize social welfare.
189  This theory grows out of utilitarian political 
theory, which argues that political institutions and laws should be designed to maximize net 
social welfare.
190  Social welfare can be defined in a number of ways.  Benthamite utilitarians 
define social welfare as the aggregation of individual preference satisfaction.  While this 
approach may be the least theoretically problematic method of measuring social welfare, it is 
impossible to administer, so welfare theorists turn to alternatives, most commonly the wealth 
maximization criterion which states that government institutions should maximize “aggregate 
welfare measured by consumers’ ability and willingness to pay for goods, services, and 
conditions, or the ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ criterion,” which provides that one state of affairs should be 
preferred to a second if the individuals who gain in welfare in the first state of affairs relative to 
the second could, by lump-sum payment, compensate those individuals who are worse off and 
                                                 
189 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Today it is acknowledges that analysis and evaluation 
of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that 
seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.”); see also Edwin Hettinger, 
Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 51 (1989) (commenting that 
justifications of intellectual property rights “turn[] on considerations of social utility”). 
190 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
3 (Clarendon Press 1907); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (4th ed. 1871); ARTHUR 
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remain better off than they would be in the second state of affairs.
191  Selecting one of these 
criteria rather than another will result in different outcomes when evaluating what legal 
frameworks to implement. 
  The premise of this approach is that, absent incentives to authors, expressive works will 
be produced at less than optimal levels because they are “public goods.”
192  In the absence of 
copyright, or a similar system of property rights, “the market price of a book or other expressive 
work will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying.”
193  This is because expressive 
works are (largely) (1) non-rivalrous and (2) non-excludable.  They are (largely) non-rivalrous 
because, unlike material resources, one person’s use of the product does not diminish the 
capacity of others to use the property as well, so the marginal cost of production (of the 
expression itself) is zero.
194  They are (largely) non-excludable because once the expressive 
                                                 
191 Fisher, supra note 185, at 177. 
192 William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 21 (2007). 
193 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 189, at 40. 
194 BENKLER, supra note 80, at 36 (2006); JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA P. LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & 
MAUREEN A. O’ROURKE, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 6 (2d ed. 2006); see 
also Waldron, supra note 188, at 870 (describing intellectual property as “non-crowdable”).  
Intellectual property works may not be entirely non-rivalrous because users may derive some 
utility from goods that are only accessible to a small number of people.  See Jeffrey Harrison, 
Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195, 204-10 
(2007) (discussing “snob” and “Veblen” effects of trademarks).  This may be a more pronounced 
phenomenon in the context of trademark than in the context of copyright, but there seem to be at 
least some copyrighted goods where Harrison’s analysis of signaling effects might apply, such as 
prints of photographs and artwork by visual artists and certain limited run books, like Tracy 
Emin’s Exploration of the Soul, which was initially released as an edition of 200 and later re-
released as an edition of 1000.  See Elizabeth Manchester, Tate Collection, Exploration of the 
Soul by Tracy Emin (Nov. 2004), 
http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?cgroupid=999999961&workid=80959&searchid=109
73&tabview=text.  Others have argued that overuse may result if intellectual property is left in 
common.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 
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works are produced; there is no easy way to prevent other people from making use of them 
without paying.
195   
  Because they are a public good, expressive works “may not be produced in the first place 
because the author and publisher may not be able to recover their costs of creating” them.
196  
Therefore, such goods, like lighthouses, roads, and national defense, may be produced at socially 
suboptimal levels in the absence of government action to ensure a higher level of production.
197  
Limited monopoly rights are one possible system of incentives provided by the government to 
induce a closer-to-socially-optimal level of production of intellectual goods.  The public good 
problems are exacerbated when there is a high level of uncertainty about whether a particular 
product will succeed on the market, because, in the absence of intellectual property rights, 
copiers can be expected to step in when a product proves highly successful but not when it is 
unsuccessful, leading creators to bear all of the downside risk but little of the upside risk of 
creating intellectual products. 
  Ultimately, the claim that in the absence of incentives intellectual goods will be under-
produced is an empirical one.  As Landes and Posner point out, there are a number of factors that 
would induce private actors to create intellectual goods in the absence of legal protection for 
intellectual property: copies may be of inferior quality (most importantly for fine art), the cost of 
copying may be greater than zero, the original publisher may be able to sell a work in the interval 
                                                 
195 COHEN, LOREN, OKEDIJI & O’ROURKE, supra note 194, at 6.  Expressive works are not 
entirely non-excludable because there are a variety of mechanisms other than copyright that 
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arrangements in the United States are limited by the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006)) 
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before copies appear on the market, the creator may use contracts to provide protection against 
copying, the creator may use technological protection measures to inhibit copying, the creator of 
the original may be able to increase the price to incorporate the price of a license to make copies, 
and the author may derive benefits from producing the intellectual work other than from sales 
revenue (like prestige or goodwill).
198  It is only if these factors prove insufficient to encourage 
the creation of intellectual property at a socially optimal level that it is necessary for the 
government to act to avoid sub-optimal production of intellectual goods. 
  Supposing that empirical research shows that the government should act, the government 
has a variety of options: it could produce cultural goods itself, it could pay private actors to 
produce cultural goods, it could award post hoc prizes to creators of such goods, it could assist 
the producers of such goods to increase the goods’ excludability, or it could award limited 
monopolies to the creators of such goods, providing them with legal tools to exclude non-payers 
from accessing the goods.
199  Copyright, a variant of the fifth solution, is justified, according to 
welfarist theories, if it is the most efficient solution.
200   
  In addition to requiring a determination of whether production of expressive goods would 
be too low in the absence of government intervention and what form of government intervention 
would be most efficient, the welfare approach requires determining what the optimal level of 
production of expressive goods is.  If a copyright scheme is selected as the optimal form of 
government intervention, the copyright regime must be shaped “so as to strike an optimal 
balance between two general considerations: the tendency of exclusive rights to stimulate 
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199 FISHER, supra note 1, at 200-01. 
200 This is the solution that Bentham preferred: “A exclusive privilege is of all the rewards the 
best proportioned, the most natural, and the least burdensome.  It produces an infinite effect, and 
it costs nothing.”  JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
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socially beneficial innovative activity, and the hazard that such rights will curtail either second-
generation innovative activity or public consumption of the fruits of innovation.”
201  This is an 
empirical question, and developing a copyright system that maximizes efficiency requires a great 
deal of fine-tuning. 
  SJ differs from welfare approaches in that, under certain circumstances, it will counsel 
against adopting IP rules that maximize social welfare (even according to a non-distorting 
Benthamite view of social welfare as the aggregation of individual preference satisfactions).  
Indeed, it will in some conditions counsel against increasing the overall basket of basic liberties, 
if doing so would undermine the fair value of the cultural liberties, or the equal political 
liberties).  SJ suggests that copyright rules that maximize social welfare as measured by 
Benthamite utilitarians would result in some individuals having distorted power to control the 
public space of culture.  Similarly, if social welfare were advanced by an interpretation of fair 
use that would provide such limited protection for parodies that authors would be unable to 
effectively express criticism of dominant cultural phenomena,
202 SJ would likely disallow the 
interpretation as a violation of the first principle of justice.  For instance, Benthamite utilitarians 
might conclude that expansive joint authorship rights are undesirable, because they increase 
transaction costs of purchasing and licensing works. While such transaction costs are of concern 
to SJ, ensuring that the lexically prior commitment to the fair value of the cultural liberties must 
come first for SJ. 
  Similarly, SJ could also require deviations from welfare approaches if a rule that 
enhanced aggregate social welfare violated the principle of equality of opportunity of cultural 
participation. 
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  Aside from these scenarios, SJ neither requires nor prohibits attempts to design 
institutions of intellectual property in such a way as to maximize social welfare.  While SJ will 
constrain the field of available choices in many situations, it leaves significant room for the 
maximization of welfare within certain bounds, which should make it at least moderately 
attractive to welfarists with some sympathy for concerns about individual rights or distributive 
justice. 
  One major difference between SJ and welfarism is that welfarism is more expansive in its 
claims about what is required of a system of copyright law.  As Ronald Dworkin argues, 
“[u]tilitarianism must claim . . . truth for itself, and therefore must claim the falsity of any theory 
that contradicts it.  It must occupy, that is, all the logical space that its content requires.”
203  Any 
welfarist theory must advance a certain, controversial interpretation of the appropriate ends of 
culture: culture should be designed to secure the maximum satisfaction of social welfare (as 
measured by some particular method such as wealth maximization or Kaldor-Hicks).  This is not 
a vision of culture that Aristotelians or theorists concerned with providing some priority to 
individual rights or even Millian utilitarians who believe that some preferences are qualitatively 
superior to others
204 are likely to endorse.  SJ is able to avoid this problem of totalization to some 
extent, because it need not endorse, for example, a culture that our moral intuitions suggest is 
ugly, since it filters out some arrangements of intellectual property entitlements without 
requiring an endorsement of a single institutional arrangement as a matter of political justice.
205  
                                                 
203 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 361 (1985). 
204 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 190, at 14 (“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”). 
205 It is theoretically possible that SJ could require the endorsement of an “ugly” culture, but this 
would be the case only if every possible arrangement of institutions that satisfied SJ was 
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SJ must assert its own truth, but it is able to do so with a more limited scope than utilitarianism, 
allowing the substantive debate about what a good culture looks like to remain open.
206 
  A potentially much deeper problem with welfare approaches is that “the intellectual 
culture of a community exerts such a profound influence over the preferences and values of its 
members that the question, whether and how much they would prefer a different culture to the 
one they have, becomes at the best deeply mysterious.”
207  To the extent that welfare approaches 
rely on current preferences about what culture should look like to shape rules for intellectual 
property, the welfare approach seems to suggest that we live in the best of all possible worlds.
208  
Hypothetically, suppose that a particular set of copyright rules will favor a certain type of 
cultural production.
209  Perhaps Congress is considering whether to provide a special fair use rule 
for low-budget documentary filmmakers that would provide a very clear rule ensuring that they 
could include images of copyrighted works in their films if such images appeared incidentally.  
Further suppose that empirical evidence suggests that more people would make and distribute 
low-budget documentary films if such a rule were put in place (because, say, it would be easier 
to obtain liability insurance and financial support if backers of documentary filmmakers did not 
have to worry about liability for copyright infringement).
210  Suppose also that the degree to 
                                                 
206 See supra fig. 1. 
207 Ronald Dworkin, Panel Discussion: Art as a Public Good, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 143, 149 
(1985); see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 2 (1988); Fisher, supra note 175, at 1733 (discussing 
the importance of “shaping preferences”); supra Part I.B. 
208 Cf. G.W. LEIBNIZ, THEODICY: ESSAYS ON THE GOODNESS OF GOD, THE FREEDOM OF MAN, 
AND THE ORIGIN OF EVIL § 196 (E.M. Huggard trans., 1951), available at 
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of all possible universes”). 
209 This hypothetical draws on Fisher, supra note 175, at 1734-76. 
210 See generally KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW? (2006) 
(discussing incidental uses of copyrighted materials in documentary films and practices of 
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which most individuals like to watch documentary films is highly dependent on the frequency 
with which they are exposed to them (another empirical question that would require testing).  In 
such a situation, it is plausible (even setting aside the possible distortions of Kaldor-Hicks and 
wealth maximization) that aggregate social welfare, as measured by present preference 
satisfaction curves, would be greater if the rule were not implemented (since there would be 
some cost to copyright holders, marginally reducing incentives to create other expressive works 
that most people would rather consume than documentary films).  However, it is also possible 
that if such a rule for documentary filmmakers were adopted, it is possible that over time, 
preferences for documentary films would increase (particularly if potential audience members 
were more likely to know people who make documentary films) and long run satisfaction of 
preferences would be maximized by adopting the rule. 
  As William W. Fisher III points out, a lawmaker adhering to the welfare approach would, 
when confronted with this situation, “have to ascertain and take into account the attitudes of the 
persons who will be affected by his decision toward alternative ways of refashioning their tastes 
and the amounts they would pay to have those attitudes respected.”
211  This runs into the 
additional problem that preferences about how we want our preferences shaped are themselves 
contingent, being conditioned on the background culture, which casts doubt on whether 
respecting such preferences is truly recognizing genuine individual preferences.
212   
                                                 
211 Fisher, supra note 175, at 1737. 
212 Fisher, supra note 175, at 1738-39.  Fisher also argues that the lawmaker’s incorporation of 
second order preferences about preferences is defective because lawmakers’ decisions generally 
affect a large number of people, so by deciding in a fashion that respects, in aggregate, 
individuals’ second order preferences about how their first order preferences should be shaped, 
the lawmaker will defer to the second order preferences of a certain group, which will “give rise 
to the liberal nightmare—the imposition on some persons of others’ conception of the good.”  Id. 
at 1738.  I am unpersuaded by this argument for two reasons.  First, as Fisher acknowledges, to 
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  The proviso of semiotic justice that is incorporated into Rawlsian political justice in SJ is 
designed to address precisely this problem.  The Rawlsian requirement of aim neutrality 
combined with the guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties provides bounds on what 
can be satisfactory arrangements of copyright rules.  SJ sets bounds that ensure that individuals 
have reasonable opportunities to pursue their own conceptions of the good.  Once the two 
principles of justice including the provisos are satisfied, SJ can agree with Thomas Scanlon that, 
“there are broad limits within which it is an entirely appropriate function of government to 
support institutions which are judged by citizens to be valuable.”
213  This allows SJ to provide at 
lease some guidance on copyright entitlements while maintaining a commitment to liberal 
individualism and acknowledging that a substantive discussion of what culture should look like 
is necessary to resolve copyright disputes. 
B. The Fairness Argument for Copyright 
                                                                                                                                                            
else ought (or ought not) to have,” the desires “should not be taken into account when making 
collective decisions.”  Id. at 1738 n.339.  Just as Dworkin suggests that a utilitarian approach not 
only can but must, in order to remain coherent, set aside first order preferences of this variety, 
DWORKIN, supra note 203, at 364, it would be plausible for a welfare theorist committed to 
liberalism to do so in this situation as well.  If the second order preferences being aggregated are 
simply preferences that modify individuals’ own first order preferences, the problem of imposing 
some persons’ conception of the good on others does not arise, or at least does not do so to any 
greater extent than when lawmakers make decisions aggregating individuals’ first order 
preferences.  Second, second order preferences need not be preferences about the good.  Second 
order preferences could be, for instance, procedural preferences about how new preferences are 
developed (for example, a preference that I develop tastes that compliment the tastes of my 
friends so that we can have the most interesting conversations possible).  Such preferences may 
avoid saying anything about the good, and crediting them in a second order preference 
aggregation would not necessarily lead to a judicial or legislative imposition of a particular 
conception of the good on all people.  Of course, some second order preferences are based on 
particular conceptions of the good, but so are some first order preferences.  I do not think that 
there is any aspect of the second order preferences that makes them necessarily more likely to 
embody thick conceptions of the good than first order preferences. 
213 Thomas Scanlon, Panel Discussion: Art as a Public Good, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 143, 169 
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  A second genre of intellectual property theory suggests that “[t]he purpose of intellectual 
property laws . . . is not to increase social welfare, but to give people what they are due—in other 
words, to treat people fairly.”
214  The substance of such theories, then, hangs on what constitutes 
fairness.   
  For a long time, the dominant theory within this genre has been a Lockean theory, based 
on John Locke’s account of the origin of property in the Second Treatise of Government.
215  The 
basic structure of the argument is as follows: every person owns herself, and thus also owns her 
own labor.  Whatever someone labors upon anything held in common, that person acquires a 
natural right of ownership over that property, as well as over the fruits of her labor.  Further, it is 
the state’s responsibility to recognize and protect this right.   
  This right is subject to certain important qualifications.  First, a person has a right to 
extract property from the common only if in doing so she leaves “enough, and as good” in 
common for others.
216  In his influential description of Lockean property rights, Robert Nozick 
argues that, for the purposes of the sufficiency proviso, a person is made worse off “by no longer 
being able to use freely (without appropriation) what he previously could.”
217  Second, because 
earth was given by God to humans to enjoy, but not to spoil or destroy, someone may only take 
out of nature as much of a resource as she can use without it spoiling.
218  A number of theorists 
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215 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88, § 27 (Peter Laslett, ed., 1988); see 
Fisher, supra note 192, at 28. 
216 Locke, supra note 215, at 288, § 27. 
217 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 176 (1974).  
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have argued that Locke’s theory applies to intellectual property just as well or better than it does 
to real property and chattels.
219 
  Additional specifications are necessary before the property rights provided by Locke’s 
theory become apparent.  First, the reasons that a person gains a natural right of ownership over 
property taken out of the common through labor are somewhat ambiguous.  At various points in 
the Second Treatise, Locke suggests that it is because humans have a right to self-preservation, 
because humans have a religious obligation to improve the land, because every person has an 
inalienable right to her own person, including her labor, and because such a system provides 
incentives to put resources taken from common to the most productive use possible.
220  Different 
reasons for the recognition of property rights in goods taken out of the common will council 
different entitlements in intellectual property.  Lockean theories of copyright must also decide 
what counts as intellectual labor and what counts as the commons from which intellectual 
property may be drawn.  Upon resolving these questions, Lockean theories argue that creators of 
expressive works obtain a property right in such works by virtue of using their labor to create 
them. 
  An alternative approach within the fairness genre of intellectual property theories is 
“equity theory,” which holds that “each participant in a collective enterprise deserves a share of 
its fruits proportionate to the magnitude of his or her contribution to the venture.”
221  Similarly to 
Lockean theories, this approach raises definitional issues concerning the “collective enterprises” 
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in which individuals participate, “contribution” that someone makes to the venture, and what 
counts as “proportional.” 
  SJ differs from fairness theories in that it does not recognize any “natural” right in 
authors.  Indeed, it does not necessarily require that authors be provided with any entitlements 
arising from their work, as long as doing so does not give rise to a cultural apparatus that does 
fails to provide for the fair equality of opportunity in cultural participation.  SJ can (and perhaps 
must) accept that property and intellectual property are conventional, and must be justified as 
part of a political theory, rather than with reference to natural rights.  At the same time, SJ can 
incorporate some of the attractive features of the fairness or natural rights approach to copyright, 
because SJ is committed to a system of copyright that sufficiently remunerates authors so that 
they can participate in professional and semi-professional cultural expression even if they are not 
wealthy or otherwise privileged.  So long as schemes of authorial rights satisfy the Rawlsian 
principles of justice and the proviso of semiotic justice, SJ cannot provide any reasons to approve 
or disapprove of any scheme of authors’ rights. 
  Even if one accepts all of the basic argument that the Lockean theories advance, this does 
not appear to resolve what, if any, property right to recognize in the creators of expressive works.  
First, establishing that creating an expressive work entitles someone to a property right in that 
work does nothing to define the appropriate scope of the property right.  Even if a Blackstonian 
idea of complete dominion made sense in real property, it is hard to imagine what the equivalent 
could be in intellectual property.
222  Second, there is the question of what one owns: does one 
own a right to one’s expression, to the ideas that it embodies, or to something else altogether?  
                                                 
222 See Shiffrin, supra note 219, at 657. Gingerich—Mashing Up Rawls—Draft of 23-Apr-11  69 
And at what level of abstraction can one be said to own this expression or idea?
223  Third, 
determining how to assign property rights to authors whose works draw on the previous works of 
other authors could be a tremendous difficulty.  What if an author’s work consists almost entirely 
of allusions to or quotations from prior works?
224  Fourth, fairness theories seem to cast no light 
on the appropriate term of copyright protection, unless it suggests a term of indefinite length, but 
this would further exacerbate the problem of apportioning property interests to past and present 
authors.
225  Fifth, the scope of the sufficiency proviso is difficult to ascertain.  Some 
commentators see the sufficiency proviso as unthreatened by the recognition of private rights in 
expressive goods because of the unlimited universe of possible expression.
226  Others, however, 
see the proviso as significantly constraining because it must disallow the removal of expressive 
resources from the common that will leave others without “enough, and as good,” because, for 
instance, a word or phrase has attained a certain degree of cultural salience
227 or because certain 
general ideas or general plots or genres are part of a common cultural heritage.
228  Similar 
arguments also arise in respect to the equity theory in defining the scope of an author’s 
contribution and how to know whether an author’s rewards are proportional to her labor. 
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  It may be possible for Lockean accounts to overcome some of these hurdles, but even 
theorists sympathetic to this notion of intellectual property have often found it necessary to 
incorporate additional substantive principles into their theories in order to provide some 
determinacy.
229  Given the tremendous diversity of rights to which authors have been entitled in 
different times in different parts of the world, it is unclear how such efforts could, as a matter of 
natural right, fix the appropriate scope of rights that an author should obtain by laboring on an 
expressive work. 
  SJ avoids this problem in part by attaching itself to a theory of justice that is rooted in a 
particular political theory of the person and the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation.  
SJ is able to bar instantiations of intellectual property law that prevent individuals from 
developing either the first or the second moral power.  At the same time, SJ purposely allows 
certain indeterminacy, as it aims to be indeterminate among theories or institutions that satisfy 
the requirements of the two principles and the provisos of SJ.  Some of the indeterminacy about 
the scope of the rights guaranteed by the two principles may be undesirable, but the worse case 
scenario is that the scope of permissible approaches expands slightly, and SJ leaves slightly more 
up for debate between other, more comprehensive theories of copyright. 
C. Personhood Theories of Property 
  The third genre of theories of intellectual property is the personhood approach, which 
argues that, “intellectual products are manifestations or extension of the identities of their 
creators.”
230  The central figure for this approach is the individual artist, who “is said to define 
herself in and through her art” and, consequently, “the law ought to provide her considerable 
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continuing control over that art.”
231  This theory is embodied in Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention
232 as well as in the United States’ Visual Artists Rights Act.
233  This approach grows, 
in part, out of G.W.F. Hegel’s argument that the ability to exercise control over some amount of 
personal property is necessary for the development of an individual personality.
234  This 
argument was developed in the context of property by Margaret Jane Radin, who argues that, 
“[m]ost people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves” and “[t]hese 
objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute 
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”
235   
  Drawing on Hegel and Radin, Justin Hughes has developed this argument in the context 
of intellectual property, arguing that intellectual property rights should be recognized in objects 
with which authors personally identify, and that some of these rights (the right to attribution and 
the right to prevent destruction or mutilation) should be inalienable.
236  In addition to Hughes’s 
approach, there are many other theories of copyright that draw on this intellectual tradition.  As 
Seana Shiffrin notes, these theories generally have one of three characteristics: (1) they argue 
that intellectual works represent their creators, and are, in some way, extensions of the creators’ 
personalities; (2) they argue that individuals need to have control over some property through 
which they can define themselves, and “intellectual works suit these purposes well”; or (3) 
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through their expressive works, authors undertake particular communicative projects, which they 
should have a right to stop others from distorting or altering.
237 
  Scholars have updated these personality theories in two important ways in light of 
contemporary developments in copyright.  First, they have expanded the scope of the theory, in 
recognition that “[a]ll persons, not just traditional graphic artists, must be afforded meaningful 
opportunities to express and define themselves artistically.”
238  In order to avoid unfairly 
privileging certain individuals (such as visual artists and poets), personhood theories must be 
stated at a high enough level of generality that they apply to the sorts of expression that many 
people engage in. 
  Second, the personhood approach “must be adjusted to take into account the fact that, in 
modern societies, most people express themselves artistically not through the manipulation of 
primary, raw materials (paint, canvass, stone, paper, ink), but by manipulating and recombining 
extant intellectual products.”
239  Thus, the personhood interests not only of one set of authors, but 
also of second generation authors seeking to make use of existing cultural products (and perhaps 
even of verbatim copiers
240) must be taken into account. 
  In order to provide guidance on what sort of copyright system, if any, should be in place, 
personhood accounts must make a decision about what personhood interests ought to be 
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promoted, and must also construct an empirical account that connects the adoption of a particular 
institution or rule to the promotion of the specified interests. 
  SJ differs from personhood theories in that it does necessarily recognize any right of 
authors to control the works that they create.  Neither Rawls’s first and second principles of 
justice nor the proviso of semiotic justice require the allocation of any particular set of property 
entitlements or moral rights to authors.  As with respect to Lockean theories of labor and natural 
property rights, SJ remains neutral with regard to claims about the personhood interests of 
creators in their works.   
  SJ may be attractive to someone who wishes to protect particular personhood interests, 
because the two principles of SJ are likely, as an empirical matter, to provide protection to some 
(but not all) personhood interests.  SJ is designed to enable people to form and develop their own 
accounts of the good and to partake of culture.  This commitment overcomes a deep tension 
within attempts to use accounts of personhood as a basis for intellectual property law: 
personhood accounts, to the extent that they are able to provide determinate rules to inform the 
creation and revision of copyright regimes, rely on controversial propositions about what the 
appropriate ends of culture are.  These accounts tend to see culture as embodying the 
personalities of authors, as they sees works of cultural expression as extension of their creators’ 
personalities.  This runs contrary to many contemporary analyses of the function of authors.
241  It 
may also be objectionable to those who aspire to a culture of cooperation and collaborative 
authorship.  
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  SJ avoids this problem because it is not committed to a substantive vision of culture as 
the product of the actions of any particular individual or group of people, and it does not argue 
that producers have any natural entitlement to rights in their products.  Rather, it recognizes 
intellectual property rights only when doing so is permitted by the two principles of justice and 
the provisos (and requires the recognition of such rights only when it is required by at least one 
of the two principles or provisos).  If a scheme of intellectual property rights is incompatible 
with the principles of SJ, it is normatively foreclosed. 
D. The Culture Argument for Copyright 
  The fourth approach to intellectual property theory is based on the premise that “there 
exists such a thing as human nature, which is mysterious and complex but nevertheless stable 
and discoverable, that people's nature causes them to flourish more under some conditions than 
others, and that social and political institutions should be organized to facilitate that 
flourishing.”
242  This approach seeks to identify the human functionings necessary for a 
flourishing life.  According to William W. Fisher III, drawing on a wide range of theorists and 
philosophers, these conditions include “health, autonomy, meaningful work, civic engagement, 
and privacy.”
243  We should imagine a culture, Fisher argues, that would make these functionings 
“widely available.”
244  Among other things, this would require “cultural diversity, a culture 
embodying a rich artistic tradition, free empowering education, political democracy, and 
semiotic democracy.”
245  We should then, Fisher argues, modify copyright law in order to 
advance this substantive conception of a just culture.
246   
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  In itself, the only guidance that the “culture” approach offers for copyright is that 
copyright should be formulated in such a way that fits with the right substantive account of the 
good.  The substantive theory of the good life then provides substantial guidance for copyright, 
suggesting, for instance, that we should modify copyright “to remove the impediments it 
sometimes poses to educational activities” and to “increase opportunities for critical or 
transformative uses of intellectual products,” avoid extending intellectual property protections to 
“things (such as facts and historical theories) essential to political conversations and 
deliberation,” replace the copyright system as applied to digital distribution of recorded media 
with “an alternative compensation system,” and adopt an “‘opt-out,’ rather than an ‘opt-in’ rule 
with respect to authors and publishers who wish not to participate in comprehensive scanning 
and indexing ventures like the Google Library Project.”
247  This genre of theory requires first 
arriving at a substantive theory of the good and then determining, empirically, whether particular 
arrangements of intellectual property institutions (or other schemes for the promotion of cultural 
expression) promote or undermine that substantive view of what constitutes a good culture. 
  SJ differs from the culture approach in that it attempts to maintain neutrality with respect 
to differing conceptions of the good.  While it necessarily rules out some conceptions of the good 
as incompatible with the proviso of semiotic justice or two principles of justice as fairness, SJ 
aspires to indifference among the remaining expressions of differing conceptions of the good, 
working to create the legal conditions necessary for as broad a range of such conceptions to be 
developed as is possible within liberal society. 
  SJ argues that there is one principal problem with the culture approach: it relies on a 
substantive account of the good in order to determine what constitutes cultural justice.  It 
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disagrees with the “culture” approach itself, which holds that intellectual property rules should 
conform to a substantive conception of the good life.  Pegging copyright rules to a substantive 
account of the good is problematic for a number of reasons that I have mentioned: It is more 
controversial, as it requires potential adherents to commit to much more than an account that is 
based only on political principles.  Additionally, it may be less stable than an account based on 
political liberalism that seeks to incorporate support for a wide number of possible 
worldviews.
248  And the culture approach ends up with the state promoting a particular 
comprehensive moral conception with which individual citizens might not agree.  To be sure, 
there may be boundaries within which it is appropriate for the state to promote particular goods 
desired by a large number of people.  However, the existence of some such boundaries is 
important in order to ensure that individuals are taken seriously as individuals. 
  Ultimately, in spite of this methodological disagreement with the “culture” theory of 
copyright, SJ is largely in agreement with it as a substantive matter.  At the very least, SJ regards 
most of the substantive perspectives taken by the “culture” theory as fitting within the range of 
permissible, although not required, interpretations of copyright.  In this sense, SJ might be 
understood as thinning out the commitments of “culture” theory, aiming to create the conditions 
necessary for a broad range of cultures to flourish.  While not all of the articulations of the good 
that are expressed in cultural space will be “attractive,” many will be, and the most pernicious of 
cultures will be excluded as incompatible with the semiotic justice proviso or the first or second 
principle of justice as fairness.  While SJ’s account of what cultural space should look like might 
not be attractive to strongly committed Aristotelians, it adds the attractive feature of a “hot” 
cultural space, where the contours of what is understood to be a just and attractive culture 
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constantly grow and evolve.  Furthermore, it might provide a case for the substantive aims of 
“culture” theory that are more attractive to pluralist liberals wary of committing to a particular 
conception of the good.  In this ways, SJ might form an overlapping consensus with the “culture” 
theory. 